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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, 
Respondent / Appellee, 
v. 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, 
Petitioner / Appellant 
Case No. 20070578-SC 
20060575-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
By virtue of having granted the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, this Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (5) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial 
court's broad discretion in issuing an equitable order for 
increased alimony upon the termination of child support. On 
certiorari, this Court does not review the decision of the trial 
court but rather that of the court of appeals. Harper v. Summit 
County, 2001 UT 10, UlO, 26 P. 3d 193 (citing State ex rel. M.W. and 
S.W., 2000 UT 79, ^8, 12 P.3d 80); see also Landes v. Capital City 
Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). The court of appeals' decision is 
reviewed for correctness. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f6, 
P.3d (citing Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, %S, 152 P.3d 
312) . 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Petitioner preserved the alimony issue by way of motion presented 
to the trial court (See, e.g., R. 64-65). 
2. Whether Petitioner is precluded from raising the tax 
results issue on certiorari due to the failure to preserve this 
issue in both the trial court and the court of appeals. This issue 
is reviewed by this Court as a matter of law for correction of 
error. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 51, 99 
P. 3d 801 (quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 
UT 48, 1(14, 48 P.3d 968); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 
HUl8-19f 1 6 4 p- 3 d 3 9 7-
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Petitioner essentially concedes on certiorari that he failed to 
preserve this issue in both the trial court and the court of 
appeals. See Appellant's Brief, p. 1; see also Argument II set 
forth in the instant Brief of Respondent. 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
and regulations, the interpretation of which is determinative, are 
set out verbatim with the appropriate citation in the body and 
arguments of the instant Brief of Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an appeal from specific provisions in the 
Decree of Divorce dealing with the trial court's equitable award of 
alimony. The parties separated in January 2003, after a lengthy 
marriage that resulted in a total of six children, four of which 
were minors at the time of trial. Approximately seven months 
later, Kynda Kay Richardson filed for divorce, to which Kenneth 
Andrew Richardson responded. 
The parties subsequently appeared before the district court 
for a bench trial, after which the trial court took the case under 
advisement. Almost four months later, the trial court issued a 
Memorandum Decision. 
Mr. Richardson filed a Motion and Memorandum, requesting the 
trial court to reconsider its ruling, to which Ms. Richardson 
responded. Almost five months later, the trial court issued 
another Memorandum Decision, granting the Motion in part and 
denying it in part. 
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Thereafter, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce. Mr. Richardson 
appealed. The court of appeals subsequently issued a Memorandum 
Decision affirming the award of alimony. 
Mr. Richardson filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which 
this Court granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are drawn in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings of fact and the evidence presented at trial. Cf. 
Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1216 (Utah 1996). 
1. The parties separated in January 2003 (R. 304:6:4-5). 
2. Several months later, Ms. Richardson filed for Divorce, 
seeking, among other things, child support and alimony consistent 
with established legal principles (R. 1-8) . 
3. Kenneth Andrew Richardson responded (R. 12-17) . 
4 . The parties appeared before the district court for a 
bench trial on February 8, 2005 (R. 44). 
5. At the time of trial, the parties had been married for 
approximately twenty-five years (R. 304:6:4-5). 
6. The parties had a total of six children over the course 
of the marriage, the following four of which were minors at the 
time of trial: Dana May Richardson (DOB: May 17, 1987); Kyle 
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Allen Richardson (DOB: July 19, 1988); Avery Keen Richardson (DOB: 
August 21, 1990); and Justin Wallace Richardson (DOB: March 25, 
1993) (R. 2; R. 304:7-8; R. 47). 
7. During trial, both parties provided detailed testimony 
over the course of almost four hours (R. 304:5-150). 
8. Ms. Richardson testified, among other things, that the 
parties' two oldest children attended college while living with the 
Richardsons, and that the parties continued to financially support 
them during that time (R. 304:31:3-11). 
9. After entertaining closing arguments by counsel, the 
trial court took the case under advisement (R. 304:151-93). 
10. About four months later, on June 2, 2005, the trial court 
issued a fourteen-page Memorandum Decision, addressing, in detail, 
the issues presented by the parties at trial (R. 46-60). See R. 
46-60, Memorandum Decision, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
11. The trial court awarded Ms. Richardson, as the primary 
caretaker of the children, sole physical and legal custody of the 
parties' minor children (R. 47). 
12. In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court duly 
considered the underlying factors relating to an award of alimony 
(R. 52-58), determining that a payment of $420 per month to Ms. 
Richardson to be a "fair and reasonable award." (R. 57). The trial 
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court concluded that alimony should be paid for a period equal to 
the length of the marriage, which was approximately twenty-five 
years (Id.). 
13. In conjunction with the alimony award, the trial court 
found that "a good part of the income needed by Ms. Richardson to 
maintain the appropriate standard of living is also attributable to 
child support payments'7 from Mr. Richardson (Id.) . The court 
determined that as the parties' children reach the age of eighteen, 
over the next few years, Ms. Richardson's ''income will be reduced 
disproportionately to the reduction of expenses both because the 
reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children 
will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18 years old" 
and, additionally, "because some expenses, such as mortgage, 
utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or 
proportionately reduced even when children do leave the home." 
(Id.). 
14. Based on this, the trial court concluded "that it is 
reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as [Ms. Richardson's] 
income from child support payments goes down and as [Mr. 
Richardson's] expenses from such payments also diminish." (Id.). 
According to the trial court, u[t]his also contributes to the goal 
of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of 
living after this long-term marriage." (Id.). 
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15. To implement the foregoing, the trial court determined 
that the "alimony payments due to [Ms. Richardson] should therefore 
increase by $100 per month, beginning the first day of the month 
after which each child turns eighteen" so that "when the last child 
turns eighteen, [Mr. Richardson's] income will have increased by 
about $1,375 per month, while commensurate alimony increases to 
[Ms. Richardson] will amount to $400 per month, leaving [Mr. 
Richardson] with some cushion that takes into account the purported 
increased cost of living in Alaska and not reducing his standard of 
living below [Ms. Richardson]." {Id.). 
16. Mr. Richardson subsequently filed a Motion and Memorandum 
for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling, asking that the trial court 
reconsider its findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum 
Decision concerning, among other things, the award of alimony (R. 
61-69). See R. 61-69, Motion and Memorandum for Reconsideration of 
Court's Ruling, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto 
as Addendum B. 
17. Ms. Richardson responded with an opposing Memorandum (R. 
70-81). See R. 70-81, Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Reconsideration of Court's Ruling, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
18. The trial court, approximately five months later, issued 
a thirteen-page Memorandum Decision (R. 103-17), granting the 
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Motion in part and denying it in part. See R. 103-17, Memorandum 
Decision, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum D. 
19. Thereafter, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions together with the Decree of Divorce (R. 213-41). 
See R. 213-41, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Decree of Divorce, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum E. 
20. Mr. Richardson appealed (R. 257-58). 
21. After full briefing, the court of appeals issued a 
Memorandum Decision in which it affirmed the award of alimony, 
concluding "that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding Ms. Richardson incremental increases in alimony as her 
child support payments terminate." See Richardson v. Richardson, 
2007 UT App 222U, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum F. 
22. Mr. Richardson filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
This Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to the 
following specific issue: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
district court's award of an additional amount for 
alimony as each child of the Petitioner and Respondent 
reaches majority and Petitioner's obligation to pay 
support for each child terminates. 
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See Order granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated October 
23, 2007, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum G. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's 
broad discretion in issuing an equitable order for increased 
alimony upon the termination of child support. By so doing, the 
court of appeals correctly determined that the trial court duly 
considered Ms. Richardson's financial needs, her ability to support 
herself, and Mr. Richardson's ability to provide support. 
The court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's award of 
increased alimony is not only consonant with this Court's stated 
purpose of alimony, it is consistent with the dictates set forth in 
both Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) ("the court shall consider all 
relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial") and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d) (vx[t]he court may, under 
appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living"). 
The trial court's award of increased alimony, as affirmed by 
the court of appeals, constituted an "equitable order" relating to 
the obligations of the parties, which the trial court rendered 
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after due consideration of the parties' financial positions and 
their standard of living. Consequently, the court of appeals' 
affirmance of the trial court's award of increased alimony upon the 
termination of child support constitutes an attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living after a long-term marriage. 
The trial court's award, affirmed by the court of appeals, was not 
based on speculation, but rather on specific and detailed 
circumstances foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
In the course of advancing his argument in the court of 
appeals, Mr. Richardson neglected to follow a critical requirement 
underlying both appellate procedure and appellate advocacy, namely, 
the duty to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial court's 
findings of fact. In his arguments presented to the court of 
appeals, Mr. Richardson couched the increased alimony issue as 
simply involving an abuse of the trial court's discretion when 
actually he challenged the trial court's underlying findings of 
fact supporting the increased alimony award. In other words, Mr. 
Richardson simply took the same position as that in his Motion for 
reconsideration presented to the trial court, rearguing the 
evidence on appeal. By so doing, he made no attempt to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings and then show that 
the findings are unsupported. 
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2. Mr. Richardson, as Petitioner, is precluded from raising 
the tax results issue on certiorari due to the failure to preserve 
this issue in both the trial court and the court of appeals. To 
preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity 
to rule on that issue. This preservation requirement and its 
underlying principles apply not only to the trial court but 
throughout the appellate process. 
The record on appeal evinces an awareness by Petitioner at 
trial of the alleged tax results issue. Moreover, it demonstrates 
that the argument generally made by Petitioner during closing 
argument, being wholly unsupported, did not alert the trial court 
to the argument that Petitioner now attempts to raise on 
certiorari. Further, Petitioner presented no tax results issue to 
the court of appeals. Consequently, this Court should decline to 
reach Petitioner's tax results issue because it was neither 
properly preserved in the trial court nor properly presented to the 
court of appeals. 
In the event that this Court were to reach the tax results 
issue, Petitioner's argument is still without merit. The trial 
court's ruling clearly refers to the increase as "alimony". 
Nowhere does the trial court refer to it as support for adult 
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children. In sum, any supposed confusion under the tax code is 
specious at best. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S BROAD DISCRETION IN ISSUING AN EQUITABLE 
ORDER FOR INCREASED ALIMONY UPON THE TERMINATION OF 
CHILD SUPPORT. 
According to well-settled Utah law, n[t]he trial court has 
broad latitude" in making orders to establish alimony. Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985) (citing Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983); Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 
(Utah 1982)/ and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 
1977)). Further, the trial court's alimony determinations "are 
entitled to a presumption of validity." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d 
1055, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. ) , cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1987)). 
As described by this Court, " ' [T]he most important function of 
alimony is to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at 
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.'" Jones, 700 P.2d 
at 1075 (quoting English, 565 P.2d at 411). In determining alimony 
awards, "the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable 
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard 
of living that existed at the time of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 30-
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3-5(8) (c) (Supp. 2005). Furthermore, "[t]he court may, under 
appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d) 
(Supp. 2005). The alimony award will not be disturbed by this 
Court "so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within 
the bounds and under the standards" set by this Court and has 
supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions. See 
Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1074 . 
This Court articulated the following three factors to be 
considered in determining alimony awards: (1) the financial needs 
and condition of the recipient spouse; (2) the ability of the 
recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for himself or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support. See Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; English, 565 P.2d at 411-
12.1 The court of appeals correctly determined that the trial 
court had duly considered Ms. Richardson's financial needs, her 
ability to support herself, and Mr. Richardson's ability to provide 
jThe trial court is also to consider the following additional 
factors in determining alimony: the length of the marriage; whether 
the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and whether the recipient spouse directly 
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for 
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse 
to attend school during the marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(8)(a)(iv)-(vii) (Supp. 2005); see R. 224-29. 
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support. See Richardson v. Richardson, 2007 UT App 222U, pp. 2-3; 
see also R. 214, 224-29 (evincing trial court's detailed 
consideration of the requisite three factors). 
The court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's award of 
increased alimony is not only consonant with this Court's stated 
purpose of alimony, it is consistent with the dictates set forth in 
both Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) ("the court shall consider all 
relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial") and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d) ("[t]he court may, under 
appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living"). This is reflected by the court 
of appeals' detailed analysis of the trial court's alimony award 
set forth in the court of appeals' Memorandum Decision. See 
Richardson, 2007 UT App 222U at p. 3; see also R. 228-29. The 
trial court's award of increased alimony, as affirmed by the court 
of appeals, constituted an "equitable order" relating to the 
obligations of the parties, which the trial court rendered after 
due consideration of the parties' financial positions and their 
standard of living. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (stating that 
"[w]hen a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in 
it equitable orders relating to children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties). 
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Mr. Richardson contends that the court of appeals erred by 
affirming the trial court's automatic, future increases in its 
alimony award. Specifically, he argues that "[t]he court of 
appeals erred by affirming an order that required Mr. Richardson to 
pay increased alimony as a substitute for non-mandatory child 
support for adult children." See Appellant's Brief, p. 9. Like 
his argument propounded in the court of appeals, Mr. Richardson 
mischaracterizes2 the considerations upon which the trial court 
based its alimony award. Contrary to Mr. Richardson's assertion, 
the trial court's ruling in no way delineates that the increases in 
alimony are for child support purposes. 
Mr. Richardson also argues that the award of increased alimony 
as the parties' children turn eighteen and child support diminishes 
is contrary to law because it is speculative. See Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 13-17. Both the record on appeal and Utah law, however, 
demonstrate otherwise. See, e.g., R. 52-58. 
This Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), 
determined that the trial court's award of alimony was inadequate 
to allow the wife a standard of living even approaching that 
experienced during the marriage. In the course of its decision, 
the Court provided the following description of the marriage: 
2See Richardson v. Richardson, 2 007 UT App 222U, pp. 1-2 (stating 
"that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the considerations upon which 
the trial court based the increases in alimony"). 
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During most of the marriage, with the full 
consent and support of her husband, [the wife] 
devoted her time to raising their four 
children and donating her services to various 
social service organizations . . . . It is 
entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in 
her mid-50's with no substantial work 
experience or training will be able to enter 
the job market and support herself in anything 
even resembling the style in which the couple 
had been living. 
Id, at 1075; see also Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (considering the appropriateness of alimony after a 
long term marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked primarily 
in the home, has limited job skills, and is in her late forties or 
fifties). 
As recognized by the court of appeals, the parties in the 
instant case had a long-term marriage, which, in turn, resulted in 
six children. Richardson, 2007 UT App 222U at p. 2. Ms. 
Richardson, for both the benefit of the family and Mr. Richardson's 
career, sacrificed her ability to acquire significant work skills 
and earning capacity to be the primary caretaker for a large family 
(R. 224, 228). Moreover, Ms. Richardson is middle-aged and is not 
likely to significantly increase her earning capacity to the 
standard of living enjoyed by the parties (Id.). 
Consequently, the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial 
court's award of increased alimony upon the termination of child 
support constitutes an attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
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standards of living after a long-term marriage. The trial court's 
award, affirmed by the court of appeals, was not based on 
speculation, but rather on specific and detailed circumstances 
''foreseeable at the time of the divorce." See Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5(8) (g) (i) ; see R. 52-58 (demonstrating detailed consideration by 
trial court of the parties' specific circumstances). 
Generally, an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed 
from "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent 
on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that 
stated by the" lower court to be the basis of its ruling. See 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^10, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v. 
McPhie, 2001 UT 61, 1} 18, 29 P. 3d 1225. The appellate court will 
address an alternative ground for affirmance if it is apparent from 
the record and briefed and argued on appeal. Dipoma, 2001 UT 61 at 
118. 
Mr. Richardson's primary argument is that the court of appeals 
should not have affirmed the trial court's issuance of an order for 
increased alimony upon the termination of child support. In the 
course of advancing his argument before the court of appeals, Mr. 
Richardson neglected to follow a critical requirement underlying 
both appellate procedure and appellate advocacy, namely, the duty 
to marshal the evidence when challenging the trial court's findings 
of fact. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (wIf the 
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appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court . 
. . .") . In his argument presented to the court of appeals, Mr. 
Richardson couched the increased alimony issue as simply involving 
an abuse of the trial court's discretion when actually he 
challenged the trial court's underlying findings of fact supporting 
the increased alimony award. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-13.3 
When challenging the trial court's findings of fact, " [a]n 
[ajppellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence." In re Estate of Bartell, 111 P. 2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989) . The burden of overturning factual findings is a 
heavy one, reflecting the policy that appellate courts do not sit 
to retry cases. Id. 
In the court of appeals, Mr. Richardson simply took the same 
position as that in his Motion for reconsideration presented to the 
trial court, rearguing his evidence on appeal.4 By so doing, he 
made no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
3Findings of fact are overturned only if they are clearly 
erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Voreover, Mr. Richardson did not challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact concerning the estimation of his income, which 
served both as the basis and a material consideration underlying the 
trial court's award of increased alimony. 
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court's findings and then show that the findings are unsupported. 
In the course of making the award of increased alimony, the trial 
court entered, among other things, the following detailed findings 
of fact 
1. Ms. Richardson, by agreement of the parties and as 
the "primary caretaker of the children prior to the 
parties' separation" is entitled to "sole physical 
and legal custody" (R. 214); 
2. Mr. Richardson's income for purposes of child 
support and alimony "is a total of $65,000 per 
year, or $5,417.00 per month" (see R. 216), and, 
after deductions, his net income before any alimony 
tax benefits is $4,465.00 (R. 226); 
3. Mr. Richardson's "reasonable expenses" are 
$3,628.00 and therefore he has a "surplus of net 
income over expenses of about $837.00 per month" 
(R. 227);5 
4. Ms. Richardson's annual salary is "$21,927.00 or 
$1,827.00 per month" (see R. 217), and, after 
deductions, "[h]er net income for alimony purposes 
is $1,512.00, and with the child support 
payment of $1,375.00 per month, her total net 
income "is therefore about $2,897.00" (see R. 224); 
5. Ms. Richardson's "work experience is relatively 
minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding 
how their family would function during the 
marriage, with only short periods of part time 
employment, and she does not appear to have 
developed any specialized job skills." {Id.); 
5T By way of its Findings of Fact, the trial court noted that 
"[n]either party presented much evidence of their standard of living 
at the time of separation" and consequently, the court relied 
"primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair substitute 
or approximation." See R. 224. 
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"There was no evidence that [Ms. Richardson] had 
either the opportunity or the capacity to earn more 
than what she is making now" and "she is fully 
employed in her present position at the present 
rate of pay" (Id.); 
Ms. Richardson's general expenses "are reasonable, 
especially considering that she is caring for four 
(4) children" (see R. 224) and that her expenses 
total "$3,306.00 per month", and that a "deficit 
between her income, including initial child 
support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore 
about $409.00 per month" (R. 225); 
"[I]t is significant that this is a long term 
marriage in which [Ms. Richardson] gave up her 
ability to improve her skills and earning capacity 
to care for a large family" (R. 228); 
"[T]hat alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair 
and reasonable award" (Id.); 
"While a significant amount of [Ms. Richardson's] 
expenses can now be attributed to minor children in 
the home, a good part of the income needed by [her] 
to maintain the appropriate standard of living is 
also attributable to child support payments from 
[Mr. Richardson]." (Id.); 
Because the children will reach the age of eighteen 
(18) by way of regular occurrence over the next few 
years, Ms. Richardson's "income will be reduced 
disproportionately to the reduction of expenses 
both because the reasonable expenses associated for 
a time even with older children will not 
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen 
and because expenses . . . will not 
necessarily be significantly or proportionately 
reduce[d] even when children do leave home" (R. 
228-29) ; 
"[I]t is reasonable to increase alimony to some 
extent as [Ms. Richardson's] income from child 
support payments goes down and as [Mr. 
Richardson's] expenses from such payments also 
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diminish" and u[t]his also contributes to the goal 
of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' 
standard of living after a long-term marriage." (R. 
229) ; 
13. "The alimony payments . . . should therefore 
increase by $100.00 per month, beginning the first 
day of the month after which each child turns 
eighteen (18)" {Id.); 
14. u0n this basis, when the last child turns eighteen 
(18), [Mr. Richardson's] income will have 
increase[d] by about $1,375.00 per month, while 
commensurate alimony increases to [Ms. Richardson] 
will amount to $400.00 per month, leaving him with 
some cushion that takes into account the purported 
increased costs of living in Alaska" and not 
reducing the parties' standard of living (Id.). 
For this reason alone, which provides an alternate ground to 
affirm, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' affirmance 
of the trial court's award of increased alimony. 
II, PETITIONER IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE TAX 
RESULTS ISSUE ON CERTIORARI DUE TO THE FAILURE TO 
PRESERVE THIS ISSUE IN BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE 
COURT OF APPEALS. 
The ruling from which Mr. Richardson appeals is the same award 
of alimony initially rendered by the trial court in its original 
Memorandum Decision issued in June 2005. Nevertheless, for 
essentially the first time in these proceedings, Mr. Richardson 
argues that "[t]he precedent set by the court of appeals causes 
confusing and inconsistent tax results." See Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 17-19. 
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u[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must 
be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on that issue/' Brookside Mobile Home 
Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, fll4, 48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger 
v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). This 
preservation requirement places the trial court on notice of the 
asserted error and provides the trial court an opportunity for 
correction at that time in the course of the trial court 
proceeding. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 
f51, 99 P.3d 801 (citing Badger, 966 P.2d at 847). For the trial 
court to be afforded the opportunity to correct the asserted error 
"
x
 (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion [,] (2) the issue 
must be specifically raised [,] and (3) the challenging party must 
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.'" Id. 
(citing Brookside, 2002 UT 48 at fl4, 48 P.3d 968 (quoting Badger, 
966 P.2d at 847)). "'Issues that are not raised at trial are 
usually deemed waived.'" Id. This preservation requirement and 
its underlying principles apply not only to the trial court but 
throughout the appellate process. See State v. Worwood, 2 007 UT 
47, ff18-19, 164 P.3d 397 (declining to reach state constitutional 
claim because petitioner, on certiorari, neither properly preserved 
the claim in the trial court nor properly presented it to the court 
of appeals). 
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Petitioner concedes on certiorari that he failed to raise the 
tax results issue. See Appellant's Brief, p. 1. As justification 
for the failure, Petitioner disingenuously claims that "[t]he tax 
issues were not raised because they did not become apparent until 
the Court of Appeals issued its decision." See id. 
Petitioner's claim is without merit. The record demonstrates 
that any tax issue resulting from the trial court's alimony award 
was as apparent at the time of the trial court's ruling as it was 
when the court of appeals affirmed the same by way of its 
Memorandum Decision. 
The closing argument of Petitioner's counsel also contradicts 
Petitioner's claim. In the course of presenting closing argument, 
Petitioner's counsel advanced the following: 
And there's another more practical reason why we 
shouldn't. There is [sic] existing cases and tax cases 
that say as soon as you start tying alimony to child 
support, there is going to be a significant problem in 
that the whole amount could be calculated as alimony and 
when that happens there is a horrendous tax consequence 
and I'm not so sure that this petitioner wants to go in 
that direction and so as a practical matter, as a legal 
matter, we believe this case needs to be decided today on 
the facts that exist today. 
(304:179:9-17). The aforementioned portion of Petitioner's closing 
argument evinces an awareness by Petitioner of the alleged tax 
results issue. Moreover, it demonstrates that the argument, being 
wholly unsupported, did not alert the trial court to the argument 
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that Petitioner now attempts to raise on certiorari.6 Further, 
Petitioner did not present the tax results issue to the court of 
appeals. Consequently, because Petitioner's tax results issue was 
neither properly preserved in the trial court nor properly 
presented to the court of appeals, this Court should decline to 
reach it. 
In the event that this Court were to reach the tax results 
issue, Petitioner's argument is still without merit. The trial 
court's ruling clearly delineates the increase as "alimony" (See R. 
229 (specifically concluding that "it is reasonable to increase 
alimony to some extent as [Ms. Richardson's] income from child 
support payments goes down and as [Mr. Richardson's] expenses from 
such payments also diminish.") (Emphasis added)). Nowhere does the 
trial court refer to it as support for adult children. In sum, any 
supposed confusion under the tax code is specious at best. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Richardson respectfully asks that 
this Court affirm the trial court's award of alimony, and that the 
6The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, noted that "[t]here 
was no evidence of the effect of alimony payments on [Mr. 
Richardson's] tax liability or alimony receipt on [Ms. Richardson's], 
but the court does not believe that tax considerations related to 
alimony would substantially alter the conclusions reached here." See 
R. 53 n.2, Memorandum Decision. 
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Court grant her any other relief the Court deems just or 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of January, 2008. 
ARNOLD \& WIGGINS, P.C. 
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Tab A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, (Issues presented at trial) 
vs. Case No. 034905249 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, 
Respondent. 
The bench trial in this matter took place on February 8, 2005, with Joseph L. Nemelka, 
Joseph Lee Nemelka, P.C, representing petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson ("Kynda") and J. Bruce 
Reading, Scalley & Reading, P.C, representing respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson 
("Kenneth"). Having considered the evidence presented at trial and the arguments of counsel, the 
court makes the following decision. 
DECISION 
A. JURISDICTION and GROUNDS. 
As a threshold matter, the court notes that Kynda has lived in Salt Lake County since January 
2003, soon after the separation of the parties in about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has 
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this case. Further, the parties have come to 
disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their life together, perhaps most importantly over the 
approach to raising and disciplining their children. While Kenneth states that he does not desire a 
divorce, the parties had the benefit of counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been 
separated for over two years and have established separate lives. The court concludes that there are 
grounds for entering a decree of divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that 
prevent the marriage from continuing. 
B. CHILD CUSTODY and SUPPORT 
There were six children born to this marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May 
Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen 
Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin Wallace Richardson, born march 25, 1993. The 
parties do not contest child custody and appear to be in agreement that Kynda should have sole 
physical and legal custody. Kynda was the primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties' 
separation and the children continue to live with her at their present home in West Valley City, while 
Kenneth has remained in Alaska, where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on 
August 20, 1980. Kynda appears to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be 
a fit parent. There is no indication that the children have any different custody preference. The court 
concludes that Kynda is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is no reason to disturb the 
parties' own agreement with respect to custody, and that it is in the best interests of the children that 
she be awarded sole physical and legal custody. Parent time issues will be addressed below. 
For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from almost any 
source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute. SeeU.C.A. § 78-45-7.7(1). At the time 
of trial Kenneth was working full time for Aurora Electric in Anchorage as a project 
manager/estimator, earning a salary of $ 1,188.47 per week according to a January 28,2005 employer 
earnings statement about $61,800 per year. Apparently some time in 2003, after the parties' 
separation, Kenneth was promoted to this supervisory position from the journeyman electrician 
position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric. He received a lower salary in the prior 
position, but normally and consistently worked substantial overtime (more than 40 hours per week) 
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during the marriage and thus earned about $5>000 (2001 W-2) to $6,000 (2002 W-2) more each year 
than he does now, because, as a supervisor, overtime is no longer available to him. Kenneth testified 
that he took the promotion because it was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged 
him to take the new position for the benefit of the company. While there is no indication other than 
timing that Kenneth took the promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of 
this proceeding, this was in significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income. 
For this reason, the court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which 
he made up to $1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to 
consider his historical overtime. In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700 per 
year as a reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child 
support and alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position 
to accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely 
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the past, 
from scrapping or other work. 
In addition, Kenneth receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the State of 
Alaska. The most recent such distribution was $ 1,984, and Kenneth testified that it was sometimes 
less and sometimes more. This annual payment falls within the broad scope of gross income under 
the statute, and the court concludes that the $ 1,984 figure is a reasonable estimate of ongoing income 
from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child support and alimony). 
Kenneth's gross income for child support purposes is therefore $61,800 plus $1,700 plus $1,984: a 
total of $65,484 per year or $5,457 per month. 
Kynda is employed by the State of Utah, working full time. Her last pay stub for 2004 
showed her annual salary to be $21,927 or $ 1,827 per month. Kynda's work experience is relatively 
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minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would function during the 
marriage. After about a year of employment, Kynda cared for the children at home during the 
marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not appear to have 
developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the opportunity or 
the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes that she is fully 
employed in her present position at her present rate of pay, which is her gross income. 
There was no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for alimony or 
child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted gross income 
are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating the share of child 
support attributable to each party, with Kenneth to be the obligated party. 
The parties propose that they should each be allocated tax deductions for two children, but 
disagree on which. No real basis for allocation was presented other than the representation that 
Kynda needed at least one child deduction to be eligible for a tax benefit. It therefore appears to the 
court that it is fair to allocate the tax deductions as follows: Dana and Justin to Kynda and Kyle and 
Avery to Kenneth. When Dana reaches eighteen, the exemptions should alternate to equalize the 
benefits as much as possible, with Kenneth having the deductions for two children and Kynda for 
one the first year in which there are only three deductions available, Kynda having two and Kenneth 
one in the second year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may 
claim one deduction; when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Kynda. In the 
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to 
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lose if the 
exemption were not available. 
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Child support should be paid retroactive from date of separation (which the court believes 
was sometime around January 2003), with Kenneth to be credited for amounts paid since that time 
against his obligations for child support and alimony. 
C. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the value and division of the certain 
personal property acquired during the marriage. This involved essentially a savings account 
containing about $1,000, a certificate of deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000, a set of 
firearms collected by Kenneth, tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, 
and three vehicles: a van in Kynda's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 
Ford Ranger) in Kenneth's possession. The parties agreed at the end of trial that Kynda receive the 
savings account, the certificate of deposit and the van and that Kenneth be awarded the two trucks, 
the tools, the firearm collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. The court has no reason to 
believe that this division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is. 
There is also a New York Life insurance policy on Kenneth's life with a $50,000 face amount 
and a cash value of about $6,300. Kenneth proposed that the policy be cashed out and the proceeds 
be shared equally between him and Kynda. It was not clear to the court what Kynda wanted in this 
regard. It appears to the court that it would be of some value to the parties and in the children's 
interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with Kenneth to pay the premiums, having the minor 
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Kynda as the trustee for the minor children. 
Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to be cashed in, with Kynda to receive within 60 
days thereafter one-half of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial. The parties 
have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received 
in payment to be divided equally between them. 
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D. REAL PROPERTY 
There are two parcels of real property at issue, the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near 
Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither 
property is encumbered by a mortgage or other significant lien. The parties appear to agree that the 
equity in each property should be divided between them, but they disagree about the value of each 
property. 
Kynda believed the Willow lot to be worth about $10,000, based on unspecified calls to real 
estate agents in the area. Kenneth estimated the lot to be worth $3,000 to $4,000 and said that it had 
an assessment value on the tax notice of $4,200. The court believes that an estimated value of 
$5,000 is reasonable approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented. 
Kynda is to receive $2,500 as her share of the Willow lot's value. 
The Eagle River home was purchased about 20 years ago for about $50,000. It was appraised 
in early 2004 at $60,000. Kenneth says the appraisal is incorrect because it indicates that the house, 
a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street and curb and gutter, which is does not have. He 
believes it is worth $47,000 based on a tax assessment and on his estimate that it will take about 
$13,000 to connect the house to municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house 
saleable. Kynda says she believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that 
the house cannot have depreciated in value since it was purchased. The appraisal indicates that 
property values in the area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax 
assessments were made. Kenneth has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value 
of the lack of a sewer hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of 
providing such an improvement. Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax 
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assessments are made in the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that 
property values have decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000 over twenty years ago. 
The court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the 
circumstances and finds that the house is worth $60,000 at the time of trial and the equity should be 
divided equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties. In 
the alternative, if Kenneth wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000 to Kynda. 
E. ALIMONY 
"[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge 
and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to the extent possible." Howell 
v. Howell, 806P.2d 1209,1212 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991), citing Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,1223 
(Utah 1980). The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three 
factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: [1] the financial conditions 
and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and [3] 
the ability of the husband to provide support." Id. at 1075 (edits by the court; citations omitted); 
U.C. A. § 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones 
factors as the essence of the inquiry). After the determination of the needs and resources of both 
parties using the Jones factors, "the court should set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to 
approximate the parties' standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible." Howell, 806 
P.2d at 1212. In the case of a long-term marriage, the alimony award "should, 'to the extent 
possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as 
possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.'" Id., quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076,1081 (Utah 1988); cf Howell, 806 P.2d at 1216 n.4 ("The alimony award, however, 
need not be large enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during 
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the marriage if that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse 
below that of the receiving spouse."). Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable 
principles," the court "may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at 
the time of trial." U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(c). 
Kynda's income, as discussed above, is $ 1,827 per month. Accepting the annual deductions 
from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax ($465.10), Social 
Security Tax ($ 1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300.88), State tax ($551.73), and health dental and vision 
insurance (together $1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about $315.00. Her net income for 
alimony purposes is therefore $1,512. (The court is not considering deductions for life insurance for 
either party because essentially voluntary (on the part of Kynda) or building cash value from this 
point forward (on the part of Kenneth)). Child support payments will be approximately $1,375 per 
month. Total net income, without consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about 
$2,897. 
As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Kynda's monthly expenses, as set 
forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four children.1 While 
she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower expenses, the court found credible her 
explanation that she had been keeping expenses deliberately low during that period because of the 
financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce and had increased her expenses to a more normal 
level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit 7. Those deductions are supported by detailed 
monthly expense reports. Nevertheless, Exhibit 7 contains some expenses that the court considers 
1
 Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of separation, 
so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair substitute or 
approximation. 
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as either one-time costs or not allowable for purposes of alimony determination. Those include 
attorneys fees and mediation costs related to the divorce in the amount of $ 1,331. They also include 
$1,779 in what appear to be one-time costs for the purchase of appliances ($906.10 to Maytag on 
January 26 and $873.05 to Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that 
amount (about $890) is a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its 
contents over the long term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a 
separate house, and ought to be included as an expense. Because the testimony indicated that the 
parties historically have made donations to their church at about 10% of income and continue to do 
so, each listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a 
continuing part of their previous and present standards of living and will include them as reasonable 
expenses for both parties. Deducting $185 per month for one-time expenses, her reasonable 
expenses are $3,306 per month. 
The deficit between her income, including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses 
is therefore about $409 per month. 
Kenneth's income, as discussed above, is $5,457 per month. This amounts to salary of 
$61,800 per year, plus$ 1,984 state payment and $ 1,700 additional attributed income, per the analysis 
set forth above. Deductions, per his weekly Direct Deposit Earnings Statement, include Medicaid 
($16.94), social security ($72.45), federal tax ($117.85), local tax ($5.40) and health insurance 
($10.25). The court is not considering deductions for 401(k) contributions, a medical flex plan and 
a 401(k) loan repayment. The loan repayment deduction (amounting to about $193 per month) is 
to pay off a $ 10,000 loan Kenneth took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay 
attorney's fees ($5,000), a down payment on a new truck ($3,000), and a deposit in a savings account 
($2,000). The court does not believe the repayments on this loan, given its timing and the use of the 
proceeds, ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions 
appear reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10 per week) 
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses 
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the 
respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes. 
The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223 or about $966 per month. 
Including an additional $26 per month to account for a proportional amount of deductions for the 
imputed $ 1700 per year (there was no evidence that the state payment of $ 1982 per year was taxed), 
the total deductions are about $992 per month, leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefit,2 
of $4,465. 
The expenses Kenneth listed in Exhibit 15, appeared to be generally reasonable, and the court 
is using that exhibit as a base for determining Kenneth's reasonable expenses, with certain 
exceptions, as discussed below. Kenneth claims total monthly expenses of $3,911.47. In addition, 
if Kenneth takes out a mortgage on the Eagle River house to pay off the equity, he will have to make 
payments on that loan. Because of his age, a 15-year amortization is reasonable, requiring a monthly 
payment of about $250 at an interest rate of about 6%. This is a reasonable additional expense, as 
Kenneth does not have any rent or mortgage payment now and intends to remain in the house and 
not sell it. Further, Kenneth has allocated about $1,350 for child support payments, when the total 
is closer to $1,375, based on the parties' combined incomes of about $7,284 per month, allocated 
about 25% to Kynda and 75% to Kenneth. These amounts should be added as expenses. 
2
 There was no evidence of the effect of alimony payments on Kenneth's tax liability or 
alimony receipt on Kynda's, but the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony 
would substantially alter the conclusions reached here. 
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Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the court does 
not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401(k) loan (about $193 per month) and life 
insurance (which the court estimates at $65 per month based on the absence of any other evidence 
other than respondent's claim to have $165 in monthly expenses for all insurance other than 
deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of alimony determination, as 
they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In addition, Kenneth claims a total 
of $350 per month in medical and dental expenses. There was no evidence of a need for health care 
that would support expenses at that level, especially since he apparently has employer-provided 
health insurance for which amounts are deducted from his salary; and absent any evidence of 
particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court believes that $50 per month is reasonable. 
Kenneth's reasonable expenses are therefore about $3,628. 
Kenneth therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837 per month.3 
Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the way of 
resources to supplement their incomes. Considering Kynda's financial condition and needs and her 
inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with Kenneth's ability to provide 
support and the significant income differential between them even taking into account the payment 
and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Kenneth should pay alimony to Kynda. In 
addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long term marriage in which Kynda gave up 
her ability to improve her work skills and earning capacity to care for a large family, so that should 
play a part in the determination of alimony amount, as well. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The 
3
 The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for income and 
expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations, especially as they are 
meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In determining alimony, the 
court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts involved. 
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court believes that alimony in the amount of $420 is a fair and reasonable award. This sum 
approximates the petitioner's need, before consideration of the alimony tax consequences, and falls 
within respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the court. 
While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children in the 
home, a good part of the income needed by Kynda to maintain the appropriate standard of living is 
also attributable to child support payments from Kenneth. As children reach the age of eighteen, 
which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court believes that Kynda's income 
will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses both because the reasonable expenses 
associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they reach 18 
years old and because some expenses, such as mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be 
significantly or proportionately reduced even when children do leave the home. For that reason, the 
court concludes that it is reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as Kynda's income from 
child support payments goes down and as Kenneth's expenses from such payments also diminish. 
This also contributes to the goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living 
after this long-term marriage. Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations 
as children reach 18 on the relative disparity of income between spouses). The alimony payments 
due to Kynda should therefore increase by $ 100 per month, beginning the first day of the month after 
which each child turns eighteen. On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen, Kenneth's income 
will have increased by about $1,375 per month, while commensurate alimony increases to Kynda 
will amount to $400 per month, leaving him with some cushion that takes into account the purported 
increased cost of living in Alaska and not reducing his standard of living below Kynda's. 
Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes in 
income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be considered 
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as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony should be paid 
retroactive to the time of separation. 
F. PARENT TIME 
While it is apparent that Kenneth loves his children, during the marriage he took a decidedly 
harsher approach to their discipline than did Kynda, going to the extreme of punishing them by the 
use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more regularly. The court believes that this goes 
beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and it apparently played a part in the break up of 
the marriage. The children remain somewhat intimidated by their father, and their distance from 
him, both emotional and geographical at this point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it 
would be best under the circumstances of the separation to contact them infrequently. While his 
telephone contacts have recently increased, he has seen the children only a few times since the 
separation. Some or all of the children have been in counseling to deal in part with issues involving 
their father. 
The court believes that it is in the best interests of the children to reestablish their relationship 
with their father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved 
allow, at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time. Under the 
circumstances, there should be a gradual increase in parent time up to guideline standards, beginning 
with visits here to Salt Lake City, where Kenneth should attend counseling sessions with the 
children's therapist and any further individual counseling reasonably recommended to facilitate the 
transition to regular parent time. During the course of this process, the parties should formulate a 
reasonable parenting plan with the input of the children's therapist, which should be in place by the 
time regular visitation is ready to begin. By saying this, the court believes that the parties should 
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seek the therapist's input on the nature and timing of this process and that the goal should be to make 
this transitional period as short as possible. 
G. ATTORNEY FEES 
Based on the court's assessment that Kynda's expenses are beyond her income and other 
resources at this point and on its conclusion that Kenneth's resources provide him with a surplus 
over his expenses (as discussed in connection with alimony, above), the court concludes that 
Kenneth should be responsible to pay Kynda's reasonable attorney fees incurred in this matter. 
Kynda has insufficient income to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up 
to the point where her needs are met, not including attorney fees. Kenneth will have a level of 
surplus and is more able to pay fees. Kynda should provide evidence of the amount and 
reasonableness of the fees she claims to the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The court has set out a number of findings and conclusions in its analysis. Counsel for 
petitioner is to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law that take into account other matters 
that ought to be included but were resolved before trial and should include additional findings and 
conclusions from the evidence presented reasonably necessary to support the court's ruling. 
DATED t h i s ^ A d a y of June, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Stephen L. Roth 
DISTRICT JUD' 
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Respondent, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, by and through his attorneys, moves the Court to 
reconsider the findings and conclusions contained in its Memorandum Decision of June 2, 2005 
(hereinafter, "Court's Ruling"). In summary, Respondent requests that the Court reconsider the following: 
1. Reconsideration of the alimony award, based upon (a) inaccurate income and deduction 
figures; (b) prospective changes in the amount and retroactive application; and (c) improper 
consideration of tithing payments. 
2. Petitioner's ability to pay attorney fees as a result of the retroactive alimony award. 
3. The Court's failure to give adequate guidance regarding the implementation of a parent-Ume 
plan. 
4. The Court's failure to address the division of the parries' retirement accounts. 
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I N T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T C O U R T 
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VS. : 
| Civil No. 034905249 DA 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, j Judge Stephen L. Roth 
j Commissioner Susan Bradford 
Respondent. j 
Respondent, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, by and through his attorneys, submits this 
Memorandum in support of his Motion to Reconsider the ruling contained in the Memorandum Decision 
of June 2, 2005 (hereinafter, "Court's Ruling"): 
A R G U M E N T 
I. The Alimony Award is Improper Because: (a) the Court's Ruling Regarding 
Respondent's Income Are Inaccurate; (b) Future Changes in Alimony Are Available 
Only Through a Petition to Modify; and (c) Tithing Payments Were Improperly 
Considered as a Component of Petitioner's Needs 
Because the alimony award of $420.00 per month is based upon an artificially inflated estimate of 
Respondent's available income, the award should be reduced. Furthermore, under Utah law, changes in 
alimony can only be made pursuant to a petition to modify. This requirement cannot be avoided by 
building changes into to the findings ot fact and Conclusions ol Law (hereinafter, "Findings"), based upon 
te 
speculation about future events. Finally, tithing is not a proper component of Petitioner's needs for 
purposes of determining alimony. 
A. The Ruling Overestimate Respondent's Ability to Pay Alimony 
The Court's Ruling overestimates Respondent's ability to pay alimony because it overstates 
Respondent's available income. Page 3 of the Ruling ragraph 4 of the Inndings of states, incorrectly, that 
Respondent recently received a distribution from the state of Alaska in the amount of SI,984.00. Instead, 
Petitioner actually received a distribution in the amount of $919.00, as shown at trial. 
The Court should therefore impute ongoing payments from the state of Alaska based upon 
imputed annual payments of $919.00, thus reducing Respondent's annual income by SI,065.00. 
Respondent's annual income, before deductions, should therefore be $62,719.00 (or $5,226.58 per month). 
After deductions of $992.00 per month, as stated in paragraph 20 of the Findings, Respondent's monthly 
available income is $4,234.58 per month. 
In addition, the Court has imputed income from Respondent's scrapping activity. Testimony at trial 
was this scrapping was done while he was in the field working at his full-time job. He is now in 
administration and does not have scrapping available to him anymore. 
B. Neither Prospective Changes in Alimony, Nor Retroactive Alimony, Can Be 
Built Into a Decree of Divorce 
The Court's ruling improperly implements retroactive alimony, and prospective increases in alimony 
as Respondent's child support payments decrease. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(g)(n) provides, however, that 
courts may not modify alimony to address the needs of a recipient that did not exist at the time of entry of 
the decree of divorce. Furthermore, the Utah Court of Appeals has unequivocally stated that " any future 
changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material change of circumstances has occurred." See 
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Uomllv. Unwell 806 V 2d 1209 (lTtah Cr \pp 1991) (emphasis added). / loivellalso mandates that the "the 
standard of living existing at or near the time of trial" is the appropriate benchmark for determining an 
alimony award. See id. at 1212. 
The Court's Ruling directly contravenes both the Howe/I decision and Utah ("ode Ann. § 30-3-
5(g)(n). Petitioner's future needs and Respondent's future ability to pay should not be pre-judged by the 
Court. See also Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that a motion to 
terminate alimony, based upon the petitioner's prospective reduction in income upon retirement, was not 
ripe for decision because petitioner had not yet retired; as such there was not a justiciable "'imminent clash 
of legal tights and obligations'"). If the Court prospectively increases alimony payments at specifically 
scheduled future times, its decision will be based primarily upon speculation rather than upon any actual 
change the circumstances of the parties. 
Based upon / lowell, Nelson, and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(g)(n), the Court's Ruling should specify 
what alimony should currently be, based upon Respondent's needs at the time of the entry of the divorce 
decree. No future umes or contingencies should be considered because there is no way of determining in 
advance the future needs and abilities of the parties. 
Likewise, the award of alimony, retroactive to the time of separation is improper. See Findings at |^ 
25. As the court pointed out in Osen v. Ose/iy (Unreported Memorandum Decision), April 6, 2000, WU 
33249404 (Utah Ct. App.), retroactive awards are 
contrary to the intent of the statute, which allows a party to move for interim 
alimony to meet the party's needs between separation and divorce. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3- 3(3) (1998) (stating "the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action") (emphasis added). It 
was not intended to be awarded as an afterthought in the final 
decree—especially when not requested by the benefitting party. See id. \\ 
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30-3-3(4) (allowing amendment to interim alimony entered "prior to entry of 
the final order") (emphasis added). 
By failing to move for interim alimony, Petitioner waived any claim for it. Retroactive alimony 
should therefore not be awarded. 
C. The Court's Ruling Improperly Consider Tithing Payments as a "Need" of 
Petitioner 
Because tithing payments, or other charitable giving, have nothing to do with a person's standard of 
living, they should not have been considered by the Court in determining the alimony award. In 
determining an alimony award, the trial court must consider, among other things, the following factors: (1) 
the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; (3) 
the ability of the obligor spouse to pay alimony; and (4) the length of the marriage. See Rehn v. Relm, 974 
P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(iv). 
The purpose of alimony is to "'equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards . . ." to 
the extent possible. See Howe//v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991) (quoting Rcisband v. Rcisbund, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App.1980). 
As far as Respondent can determine, there is no Utah case or statute that authorizes the 
consideration of tithing as a factor in determining an alimony award. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
defined "standard of living" as "a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to 
maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances." JHowe/1 v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) {citing Webster's Third New International 
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Dictionary 2223 (1986)). Charitable donations and tithing are unrelated to a party's own necessities, 
comforts, and luxuries, and should therefore not be considered in determining an alimony award. 
II. If Retroactive Alimony is Permitted, then Petitioner Will Have Sufficient Income to 
Pay Her Attorney Fees, Making the Award of Attorney Fees to Petitioner Improper 
The award of retroactive alimony, if it stands, will be a windfall for Petitioner. There was no 
evidence that Petitioner incurred debts in order to survive from the dme of separation to the time of trial. 
Apparently, Petitioner was able to reduce her expenses during this period and to manage her financial affairs 
adequately. The award of retroactive alimony therefore amounts to $10,500.00 windfall (twenty five months 
from the parties' separation to the time of trial, multiplied by $420.00). This is more than enough to enable 
Petitioner to pay her attorney fees of $5,280.00, as claimed in the Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed by her 
counsel in this matter. 
Even if the Court believes the award of attorney fees to Petitioner is proper, Respondent object to 
the Affidavit of Attorney Fees, submitted by Petitioner's counsel, because it fails to meet the requirements 
of Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rule, all such affidavits must set forth "a 
reasonably detailed description of the time spent andwork performed. . ." See Utah R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). 
Petitioner's counsel merely states his hours, but fails to detail the work performed. As such, his 
request fails to comply with Rule 73 and should be denied. 
III. The Findings Improperly Delegate the Responsibility to Determine Parent-Time to 
the Parties 
Section 30-3-35 of the Utah Code establishes the minimum parent time to which a noncustodial 
parent is entitled "unless a parent can establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or 
less parent-time should be awarded . ." See Utah ("ode \nn. § 30-3-34(2). No such proof was provided by 
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the preponderance of the evidence. But that being said, the Court has suggested a "gradual increase in 
parent time" with such transition beginning with visits in Salt Lake City with Respondent attending 
counseling with the children's therapist. In addition, Respondent should attend anv individual counseling 
recommended. 
The problem with this procedure is the children are not in therapy, so there is no counseling to 
attend. Further, many child therapists will not give therapy to adults. There is nothing in the order to 
indicaute what should happen in that circumstance. Who is the individual to recommend individual 
counseling and how does the individual counselor give input to the visitation schedule? More guidance is 
needed. 
Finally, the Court has ordered the parties to formulate a reasonable parenting plan. The Respondent 
has requested visitation on at least 20 occasions since separation to the present and has only been allowed 
visitation six occasions. Again, there is no child therapist in existence to assist in the parenting plan. The 
parties cannot agree — that is why trial was necessary. 
There is a need for further guidance from the Court. 
DATED this ~~7 day of July, 2005. 
SCALLEY & R E A D I N G , P.C. 
Bpdce Reading 
Attorney for Respondent 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs ] 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, ; 
Respondent ] 
) Case No 034905249 DA 
) Judge Stephen L Roth 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
PETITIONER'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S RULING 
Petitioner, Kynda Kay Richardson, by and through her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka, 
hereby submits this memorandum in opposition to Respondent's A/o/zow for Reconsideration of 
Couit's Ruling, and Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration^ as 
follows 
iU 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Alimony Award is Appropriate 
A. The Ruling does not overestimate Respondent's Ability to Pay 
Alimony 
In his Memorandum Respondent argues that the Court erred by overestimating his ability 
to pay alimony by "overstating [his] available income " Respondent asserts that the Court erred in 
finding that he received a distribution from the State of Alaska of $1,984 per year instead of $919 
per year The Court did not err in this regard Testimony at trial showed that the yearly Alaska 
distribution varied anywhere from $500 to $2,000 per year Even assuming arguendo that the 
Court erred in overstating this amount by $1,000, the error is harmless The monthly increase to 
Respondent's income would be only $89 per month. This is not a substantial enough amount to 
alter the Court's ruling 
Respondent also argues that the Court should not have imputed him income from his 
scrapping activity The Court did not err in this regard Testimony at trial showed that 
Respondent did additional scrapping work while he was working in the field However, the 
evidence also showed that Respondent has access to every job site and can still do the scrapping 
work it from wherever he is regardless of his other administrative duties Moreover, the Court 
considered Respondent's reduction in income to be voluntary and that his scrapping work was 
something that he had done historically during the marriage For this reason, the Court thought it 
2 
was fair to consider his previous scrapping activities which the Court specified as a previous 
source of income The Court did exactly what is allowable pursuant to Utah Case Law and that 
is, when there is a reduction of income, just prior to or during a divorce action being filed, then it 
is perfectly reasonable to use historical and other income for purposes of establishing income for 
child support and alimony calculations The Court specifically states its findings 
While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took 
the promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for 
purposes of this proceeding, this was in significant part a voluntary 
decision on his part that reduced his income. For this reason, the 
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping 
activities (in which he made up to $1,000 per year from time to 
time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his 
historical overtime In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to 
impute $1,700 00 per year a reasonable assessment of Kenneth's 
additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and 
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in 
his work position to accommodate reasonable work-related goals, 
while recognizing that those changes are largely voluntary, as well 
as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he 
has in the past, from scrapping or other work 
Furthermore, Respondent is trying to introduce evidence that was not introduced at trial 
Respondent is trying to "boot strap" additional argument into his Motion and Memorandum, and 
such should be stricken 
3 
B. The Court did not err in awarding Prospective Increases in Alimony, 
nor did it err in Awarding Retroactive Alimony 
Respondent argues that the Court improperly implemented retroactive alimony and 
perspective increases of alimony as the child support payments decrease Respondent points to 
§30-3-5g(ii) of the Utah Code in arguing that the Court may not modify alimony to address needs 
that did not exist at the entry of the Decree of Divorce This argument is misplaced At the time 
of trial, Petitioner specifically testified, in open court and by exhibit, what her expenses where. 
The Court found her expenses in the sum of $3,306 00 per month to be reasonable The Court 
found that Petitioner could only meet those expenses with both the alimony and child support 
being paid to her The Court found that with child support of $1,374, and with a net income of 
$1,512, Petitioner would need alimony of $409 to meet her expenses The Court found that as 
the child support decreased, so would Petitioner's ability to pay her expenses, while Respondent's 
ability to pay his expenses and alimony would increase Petitioner's expenses would remain the 
same and, therefore, any increase in prospective alimony is based upon "the needs of [Petitioner]" 
that exist at the "time of entry of decree of divorce," or trial The Court did not find that 
Petitioner's expenses would be greater in the future and that she would therefore need more 
alimony The Court simply awarded alimony based upon the information before it as to 
Petitioner's needs This is a fact known and taken into consideration at trial 
4 
The Court made further specific findings for its reasoning to increase the alimony once the 
child support payments went down This was a very long-term marriage and as Respondent's 
child support obligation went down as the children reached the age of eighteen (18), this would 
not necessarily mean a change in the expenses for the children in Petitioner's custody Further, 
the Court wanted to maintain a rough equivalence of the parties standard of living after a long-
term marriage The Court recognized that as the children grow older the Respondent's income 
will increase automatically, while Petitioner's expenses will not necessarily decrease 
Respondent's reliance on the Howell case is misplaced The Court in Howell did state that 
any future changes in alimony are limited to situations where a material change of circumstances 
has occurred The Howell Court did not elaborate on that statement and the facts of the Howell 
case do not assist Respondent in this case However, simply stating that the alimony will increase 
incrementally, does not mean that this is a "future change" as contemplated by Howell This 
Court has ruled what the alimony award would be now and as the minor children reach the age of 
majority Therefore, there will be no "future" changes in alimony Of course, the Court's current 
award of alimony would be changed but only if there is a substantial material change of 
circumstances 
Respondent also argues that Howell mandates that the standard of living existing at or 
near the time of trial is the appropriate bench mark This is correct The Court looked at the 
standard of living of the parties and found Petitioner's expenses to be reasonable and her income, 
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including child support, left a shortfall The Court also found that Respondent had discretionary 
income of $837 each and every month Thus, the Court did consider the standard of living 
existing at the time of trial and, therefore, did not err The Court is not looking at the standard of 
living that may occur in the future because the Court is assuming that the expenses and income of 
the parties will remain the same The Court is calculating and allowing an increase in the alimony 
award as child support is decreased It is fact that is known now, a fact that is forseeable and a 
fact that is contemplated 
Contrary to Respondent's argument, future needs and future ability to pay are not being 
prejudged by the Court The Court's decision is not based upon speculation or conjecture The 
decision is based upon what the Court knows now in terms of the parties' incomes and expenses, 
and the fact that the Court knows now that the child support will go down 
The Court could have very well found that alimony should be awarded in the sum of 
$820 00 This is roughly what is available for alimony from Respondent's surplus The Court 
could very well say that the alimony award is $820 00 to be paid $420 00 now with an additional 
$100 00 at each time Regardless, the outcome is still the same All of the issues are known All 
of the amounts are known and, therefore, there is nothing hindering the Court's order in making 
the appropriate findings in that regard Nothing of the Court's ruling violates the Howell nor 
Utah Code § 30-3-5g(ii) 
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Respondent repeats several times that the concept that future contingencies should not be 
considered because there is no way of determining in advance the future needs and abilities of the 
parties Again, the Court is awarding alimony based upon the current ability to pay of the parties. 
It is not relying on any determination of future income nor future expenses 
Respondent also argues that the award of alimony retroactive at the time of separation is 
improper This argument is also misplaced During the separation of the parties, Respondent was 
paying support each and every month to Petitioner Such funds were not designated as child 
support or alimony. Respondent argues that in order for any retroactive alimony to be awarded, 
Petitioner had to bring a motion beforehand However, when one party, such as Respondent in 
this case, is already paying some amount of money for support, there is simply no need to file a 
motion for an interim order The Court in this matter is simply indicating that the $420 00 current 
alimony award would be retroactive back to the date of the parties separation and any amounts 
paid by Respondent during that time would be applied toward this obligation Petitioner could 
not, therefore, have waived her ability to interim alimony as it was already being paid, albeit in an 
imprecise amount Moreover, during this time the parties were negotiating to resolve the support 
issues and all other issues of the divorce Requiring the parties to litigate matters over which they 
are trying to negotiate a resolution would be contrary to the sense of equity, justice and judicial 
economy 
7 
C. The Court Properly Considered Tithing as a Need of Petitioner 
Respondent argues that the Court cannot consider tithing as an expense of the parties 
Respondent argues that tithing payments have nothing to do with a person's standard of living 
and should not have been considered in the alimony award This argument is incorrect and 
somewhat disingenuous The Court in its findings specifically indicates that the evidence that the 
parties 
historically made donations to the Church at about ten percent 
(10%) of income and continue to do so, each listing such donations 
as part of their expenses and the Court considers these donations as 
a continuing part of their previous and present standards of living 
and will include them as reasonable expenses for both parties 
Thus, the Court allowed both parties to claim tithing as an expense and part of their 
standards of living Both parties were treated equally in this regard, although allowing 
Respondent to claim his alimony as an expense provides him an even greater monthly amount of 
discretionary income an additional $495 Respondent points to a number of cases that he asserts 
support his position that the Court cannot consider tithing as part of a standard of living 
Respondent states that none of these cases authorizes a Court to consider alimony as an expense 
However, Respondent ignores the fact that no case law or statutory authority prohibits the Court 
from considering tithing as a factor in determining an alimony award In fact, the Court is 
supposed to consider the "financial condition" of the parties In Howell^ the Utah Court of 
Appeals did define the standard of living as a "minimum of necessities, comforts or luxuries that is 
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essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper status or circumstances " Howell does 
not, however, further delineate what is meant by the foregoing language Common sense dictates 
that "customary" means what the parties were use to or the status quo "Luxuries" would include 
expenses that are not necessary for minimal survival, but for things such as vacations, golf lessons, 
tanning, etc Luxuries could also very easily include tithing or donations If Respondent did not 
believe that the Court should consider tithing or donations, why did he expect the Court to 
consider his donations as an expense? 
As Howell indicates, trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony in 
divorce cases and such decisions will be held upon appeal unless a clear and prejudicial use of 
discretion is demonstrated No such abuse of discretion has been shown 
II. Petitioner will not have sufficient income to pay her attorney's fees even if 
retroactive alimony is permitted. 
Respondent claims that retroactive alimony would be a windfall for Petitioner This is not 
accurate During the time of the parties separation, Respondent has been living very frugally as 
found by the Court However, Respondent has been able to enjoy a greater standard of living 
having the greater income of the parties Furthermore, the retroactive alimony may or may not 
amount to $10,500, given the fact that during the parties separation Respondent voluntarily paid 
support for the minor children and for Petitioner The only fact that remains is what amounts are 
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still due and owing for retroactive child support and alimony There are offsets which need to be 
taken into consideration which can be included in any findings 
Respondent argues that the Affidavit of Attorneys Fees fails to meet the requirements for 
Rule 73 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure However, Respondent fails to recall that at trial that as 
part of his exhibits, Petitioner included a detailed copy of each his attorneys fees which was 
provided as an exhibit to the Court Furthermore, Petitioner's counsel indicated to the Court the 
amount of the hourly fee, the complexity of the case, and that he was requesting fees This was 
all made a part of record and placed with the Court as evidence. Besides, the purported Affidavit 
as to Attorney's Fees has not even been filed with the Court Petitioner's counsel will submit a 
sufficiently detailed and formal affidavit with the final documents 
III. The Findings do not Improperly Delegate Responsibility of Parent-time to 
the Parties. 
§ 30-3-35 of the Utah Code specifically indicates that any visitation or parent-time 
established by the parties is preferred to a Court mandated award Respondent requests that he be 
awarded the minimum parent-time pursuant to § 30-3-35 of the Utah Code However, that 
statute contemplated both parents living within a reasonably close proximity Respondent lives in 
Alaska and Petitioner lives in Utah Therefore, it is certainly impractical that Respondent have 
parent-time one night a week and every other weekend 
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Respondent's argument that no proof was provided to show that less parent-time should 
be awarded is inaccurate The evidence showed, as the Court found, the level of abuse by 
Respondent The fact that some of the minor children are now in counseling and the fact of 
Respondent's inability and unwillingness to visit the children for substantial periods of time, all 
contribute to the reasoning and the findings of the Court in that regard Evidence was placed on 
the record that the children are still intimidated by their father Furthermore, the Court did in fact 
order that the applicable guidelines~§ 30-3-36 of the Utah Code—would be appropriate at some 
point in the future after a gradual increase occurred The Court ordered that the parties formulate 
a reasonable parenting plan with the children's therapist, which should be in place before standard 
parent-time occurs It is hard to see how this can be an inappropriate award or an inappropriate 
procedure for establishing Respondent's parent-time The Court has given specific guidance to 
the parties on how to deal with the issue If the parties are unable to resolve any parenting issues, 
they should be ordered to go to mediation to assist them in resolving those issues This should 
not, however, suspended the entry of the Decree of Divorce in this matter 
Respondent's statements that Petitioner has denied him parent-time since the trial is false, 
and, once again, additional evidence he is trying to "boot strap" onto his Motion 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, pursuant to the foregoing, Petitioner requests that Respondent's Motion 
for Reconsideration of Court '$ Ruling be denied and that Respondent be responsible for 
Petitioner's attorney's fees incurred in responding to the Motion 
DATED this \°[ (lav of ItM, , 2Q05 
Nemelka 
for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum was mailed, U S First 
Class Mail, postage prepaid, this l°l* day of J t ^ S 2005, to 
J Bruce Reading 
SCALLEY & READING, P C 
50 South Main, Suite 950 
P O Box 11429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0429 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, (Respondent's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Objection to 
vs. Proposed Findings and Conclusions) 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, Case No. 034905249 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
Respondent. 
Respondent has filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling (the "Reconsideration 
Motion"), supported by his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration ("Respondent's 
Memorandum"), asking the court to reconsider certain aspects of its ruling, set out in a Memorandum 
Decision, after trial in this matter. Respondent also filed an Objection to Proposed Findings and 
Decree, supported by the same Respondent's Memorandum. Petitioner filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling ("Petitioner's 
Opposition"). Respondent filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
and filed a Notice to Submit the matter for decision on October 5, 2005. Having considered the 
parties' memoranda and reconsidered the evidence and arguments presented at trial, the court makes 
the following decision. 
DECISION 
A THE ALIMONY AWARD. 
Respondent asserts that the court's alimony award is improper because the court's assessment 
of respondent's income overestimated his ability to pay, the provisions for increases in alimony 
based on future reductions in child support and for retroactive alimony are contrary to law, and 
tithing payments should not have been considered as a component of petitioner's needs. Each issue 
is addressed below. 
1. Overestimate of Respondent's Income. 
Respondent states that the court used an erroneous figure of $1984 as his 2004 annual 
distribution from the State of Alaska, when his testimony was that the 2004 amount was $919, but 
varied yearly. Respondent did not specify the level of variation, and the court believes that he would 
have done so if it was to his advantage. The court recalls that petitioner testified that the distribution 
was $1984 in 2004, that it had been about $2,000 in past years, but varied yearly. Apparently the 
court misheard petitioner's testimony about the amount of the 2004 distribution, but generally found 
petitioner's testimony to be credible. Accepting that the correct figure for 2004 was $919, however, 
and taking into account petitioner's testimony about the level of distributions in past years of about 
$2,000 but with annual variations, perhaps as low as $500, the court finds that a reasonable estimate 
of respondent's income from state distributions is between $500 and $2000, with the average bearing 
significantly toward the higher figure, or about $ 1,500. Taking into account this change, the court's 
conclusion regarding respondent's income (as set out on page 3 of the Memorandum Decision), is 
decreased by $484, from $65,484 per year to $65,000 per year, and consequently from $5,457 per 
month to $5,417, a difference of $40 per month. This change is not significant, and does not affect 
the court's conclusion in the Memorandum Decision about respondent's ability to pay alimony. 
Respondent also states that the "scrapping" activity is no longer available to respondent, 
because he did this while working in the field and he does not work in the field in his new 
management job. In attributing $ 1,700 in additional income to respondent (Memorandum Decision 
at 3), the court considered the fact that after the separation, respondent had voluntarily reduced his 
income by taking a management job that did not allow him to benefit from the overtime that he had 
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historically worked.1 The court does not believe that the testimony requires a conclusion that 
respondent's previous scrapping activities are now foreclosed to him because of his new position. 
In addition, the court considered these activities, undertaken during the marriage along with overtime 
at work, as part of respondent's historical earning capacity that was appropriately taken into account 
in light of his voluntary reduction in income. 
The court therefore concludes that its ruling did not overestimate respondent's ability to pay 
alimony. 
2. Future Increases in Alimony as Child Support Ends. 
Respondent argues that the provision for future increases in alimony as the parties' children 
turn eighteen and child support diminishes is contrary to law, because it is based on speculation 
about the future needs and circumstances of the parties. 
In Howell, the court noted that "Utah's appellate courts have considered the appropriateness 
of alimony after a long term marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked primarily in the home, 
has limited job skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213 (citations 
omitted). This is just such a case. The parties were married for over twenty years and had six 
children. Petitioner gave up her ability to acquire significant work skills and earning capacity to care 
for a large family, and continued to care for the remaining four minor children at the time of trial. 
She is in her forties or fifties and is not likely to significantly increase her earning capacity to a point 
where she can support herself at a standard the parties enjoyed during marriage. See Jones v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072,1075 (Utah 1985), quoted in Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. While an alimony award of 
1
 While the court has concluded that respondent did not do this for the purpose of reducing 
his income, the court believes that he did accept this position, which he had declined before, in part 
because the parties' separation and pending divorce decreased his incentive to continue working in 
a position that provided more income but was perhaps less attractive to him as a job. 
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$420 per month at this point is appropriate to address petitioner's needs, it is based on petitioner's 
present sources of income, including about $1,375 in child support, which will decrease 
incrementally as each of the four minor children turns eighteen. The first of those turned eighteen 
in May 2005 and the second will reach majority in 2006, with the other two following. 
In holding that an alimony award of $ 1,800 was "clearly erroneous" (i.e., too low) the Howell 
court took note of the problem that occurs in situations where predictable decreases in child support 
are not taken into account in setting alimony awards: 
Child support set pursuant to child support guidelines at $1363, plus alimony of 
$1800, plus defendant's potential salary as determined by the court of $645, yields 
gross monthly income of $3808 for defendant and her son. Plaintiff, after deducting 
child support and alimony, has gross monthly income of $6,837. When his child 
support obligation ceases, approximately fifteen months after the decree, he will have 
gross monthly income of $8200 in comparison to defendant's $2445. Defendant fits 
the profile described in Jones and other cases: she is approximately fifty years old, 
has minimal marketable job skills, and has spent most of the thirty plus years of the 
parties' marriage raising and caring for their five children and their home, 
presumably with the concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving significant 
salary levels in the future is slim. The alimony set by the court does not come close 
to equalizing the parties' standard of living as of the time of the divorce, but allows 
plaintiff a two to four times advantage. 
Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote at the end of the sentence describing the 
disparity in the parties' income after child support ceases, the court quoted the statement of the Utah 
Task Force on Gender and Justice Report to the Utah Judicial Council: '"If courts award child 
support in lieu of permanent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the financial impact on the 
remaining family as each child reached age 18 and his or her award terminates." Id at 1213 n.2 
(citation omitted). 
While not as dramatically as in Howell, when the Richardsons' remaining minor children turn 
eighteen, the relative disparity in the parties' incomes will increase significantly. Petitioner has gross 
monthly income of about $3,622, including salary at $1,827, child support of $1,375 and $420 in 
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alimony, from which she must provide for herself and four children. Respondent's gross monthly 
income of $5,417, after deducting an equivalent amount of child support and alimony, is also 
coincidental ly about $3,622,2 from which he must provide for only himself. As his child support 
obligation decreases, respondent's income will increase proportionately as petitioner's decreases. 
At the end of his child support obligation, less than seven years from now, with no incremental 
increases in alimony respondent will have gross monthly income of about $5,000 ($5,417 less $420) 
in comparison to petitioner's $2,250 ($ 1,827 plus $420). With the addition to alimony of increments 
totaling $400 at the end of child support, petitioner's income will be about $2,650 in comparison to 
respondent's $4,600. The court believes that incremental increases in alimony as child support 
decreases reflects the reality that petitioner will continue to incur expenses that will not be reduced 
dollar-for-dollar as the children reach eighteen and, perhaps more importantly, roughly meets the 
goal of "better equalizing] the parties' ability to go forward with their respective lives" after this 
long-term marriage. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. 
The court therefore concludes that the incremental increases in alimony "anticipate the 
financial impact on the remaining family as each child reach[es] age 18 and his or her award 
terminates" and serve to equalize the parties' abilities to go on with their lives in a rough 
approximation to the standard of living during the marriage, and therefore are not based on 
speculation, but on circumstances "foreseeable at the time of the divorce" {see U.C.A. § 30-3-
5(8)(g)(i)) and fall within the compass of Utah law. 
2
 In its earlier Memorandum Decision, the court used net figures; these gross figures are used 
simply for a rough comparison, similar to that made by the Court of Appeals in Howell. 
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3. Retroactive Award of Alimony. 
Respondent argues, in effect, that the court's ruling that the alimony award should be 
retroactive to the date of separation is contrary to the statutory scheme set out in U.C.A. § 30-3-3. 
In support of this position, respondent cites an unpublished Court of Appeals decision, Osen v Osen, 
2000 UT App 90, which reasoned that an award of alimony meant to compensate for the appellant's 
not having had to pay temporary support prior to trial, to the extent it purported to be "an award of 
retroactive interim alimony," was "contrary to the intent of the statute," which allows a party to move 
for interim alimony to meet the party's needs between separation and divorce," Id. at n.l, citing 
U.C.A. § 30-3-3(3). The court noted that temporary support "was not intended to be awarded as an 
afterthought in the final decree-especially when not requested by the benefitting party." Id, citing 
U.C.A. § 30-3-3(4). 
Petitioner counters that no temporary support award was sought or entered because 
respondent was voluntarily paying some amount of support during the pendency of the suit that was 
not denominated as either child support or maintenance and that, under the circumstances, she should 
not be required to have sought a temporary support order as a prerequisite to obtaining a support 
award that is retroactive. She argues that this would require the parties "to litigate matters over 
which they are trying to negotiate a resolution" and would not be equitable or support judicial 
economy. 
Osen, as an unpublished decision, does not have the force of precedent, and its analysis of 
the statute is cursory and amounts to dicta, because it was simply an aside contained in a footnote 
that was not necessary to the result reached. The court believes that section 30-3-3 does not impose 
the constraint on retroactive support awards that respondent asserts. "The precept is well recognized 
that the trial court is vested with broad equitable powers in divorce matters." Curry v Curry, 321 
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P.2d 939,942 (Utah 1958). For example, in a related area these equitable powers have been found 
by the Utah Court of Appeals, under applicable statutes and "Utah common law," to include "the 
discretion to award modified alimony retroactively to the date a modification petition is served." 
Wilde v Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, K 23. There is no evident reason why a court with statutory 
authority to award temporary alimony during pending litigation and discretion to retroactively award 
modified alimony would not also have discretion to make a retroactive award of temporary alimony 
under its broad equitable powers. Spouses have common law and statutory duties to provide support 
for dependent children and a dependent spouse. The statutory provision for temporary support orders 
therefore appears to be a codification of a recognized obligation rather than the creation of a new 
one. Recognizing this, it is not uncommon in this district for initial temporary support awards under 
section 30-3-3 to be made retroactive to the date of filing of the petition or even to the date of 
separation. 
In addition, because of the inherently equitable nature of divorce proceedings, Utah courts 
encourage non-litigative resolution of divorce issues through voluntary and mandatory mediation. 
If retroactive temporary support was precluded by law where an order is not already in place to be 
modified, parties who delayed formal litigation for temporary orders in order to reach resolution on 
support issues through negotiation or mediation would be put at a significant disadvantage, and the 
value and appeal of these less costly and less confrontational approaches would be reduced. 
The issue then is whether in this context, the provisions of section 30-3-3 preclude the 
retroactive award of support that does not amount to the modification of an existing order. Section 
30-3-3 provides for an order of temporary support "during the pendency of the action" and for 
amendment of "[o]rders entered under this section . . . during the course of the action or in the final 
order or judgment." U.C.A § 30-3-3(3) & (4) There is nothing in this language that plainly states 
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that the temporary award authorized here cannot be made retroactive. It simply provides that awards 
already made can be modified. That the legislature knew how to restrict retroactive support awards 
is clear from the language of U.C.A. § 78-45-9.3(3) & (4) (formerly part of U.C.A. § 30-3-10.6), 
which provides clear limitations on the retroactive effect of modifications to existing awards. The 
legislature apparently chose not to include such restrictions in section 30-3-3; rather, the language 
of that section provides only that existing temporary orders are subject to modification. The court 
concludes that it has discretion to award spousal support retroactively, particularly where the petition 
requests such support, which is the case here. See Petition for Divorce, filed on August 26, 2003, 
a t ! 2 1 . 
Nevertheless, based on reconsideration of the evidence relating to the parties' pre-trial 
circumstances, the court believes that the retroactive award of alimony should be modified to some 
extent. The court finds from the evidence presented at trial that after the separation and petitioner's 
move to Salt Lake City, respondent paid to her for some significant period of time up to $600 a week 
in undifferentiated "support," apparently meant to include child support and spousal support. This 
amount is substantially higher than the combined alimony and child support ordered by the court. 
Once petitioner was served with the Petition for Divorce in September 2003, however, respondent 
reduced his support payments to about $1,350, which he believed was the amount of child support 
he would be required to pay, and which is very close to the amount required under Utah law. 
Petitioner testified that her needs increased in May 2004, when her expenses increased, largely due 
to taking on the costs of paying the mortgage on a house, compared with a lower monthly rental cost 
before that, and associated increased utility expenses. But she also testified that she had been 
significantly curtailing spending generally during that period because of her reduced circumstances 
after respondent had substantially reduced his support payments after the Petition was filed, while 
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respondent's circumstances did not require him to similarly economize. In setting the amount of 
alimony, the court relied primarily on evidence about petitioner's financial condition and needs, and 
her ability to meet those needs on her own, that appeared to be roughly similar from May 2004 
forward, because that period seemed to more accurately reflect the standard of living before 
separation. 
Taking all this into consideration, together with the broader context of the parties' marriage, 
the court believes it is equitable to make alimony retroactive to and including May 2004. The court 
has considered the respondent's ability to pay support before trial, based on the court's analysis in 
the original Memorandum Decision, which appears to be as pertinent to the period going back to 
time of separation as to the time of trial. In addition, the court has considered the petitioner's needs, 
as discussed above and in the Memorandum Decision, as well as the fact that respondent's pre-filing 
support contributions were considerably larger than the court's combined child support and alimony 
award, which acts to roughly offset any deficit petitioner may have experienced during the period 
from filing up to May 2004. 
The court further concludes that the higher amounts paid by respondent before filing are 
sufficient to offset any slight deficiency in child support that may have accrued before trial. 
Therefore child support need not be made retroactive. 
The court's ruling set out in the Memorandum Decision is therefore modified to provide that 
alimony is to be retroactive to and including May 2004 and child support is not to be retroactive, the 
child support obligation having been complied with. Any overpayment of support obligations that 
respondent may have made before filing was voluntary and has been taken into account in this 
decision. Therefore, the court's ruling in the Memorandum Decision (at 5) that the respondent is "to 
be credited for amounts paid since [the date of separation] against his obligations for child support 
and alimony" is stricken. 
4. Consideration of Church Donations (Tithing). 
Respondent argues that the court should not have considered the parties' contributions to 
their church ("tithing") in determining the award of alimony "[bjecause tithing payments, or other 
charitable giving, have nothing to do with 3 person's standard of living . . . ." Respondent's 
Memorandum at 4. 
Utah courts have ruled that "the court should set alimony . . . to approximate the parties' 
standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible. It follows that if the payor spouse's 
resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but should also 
considerthe recipient spouse's 'station in life.'" Howell v. Howell, 806P.2d 1209,1212 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1991) (citations omitted). In this regard "4[s]tandard of living is defined as 'a minimum of 
necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to maintaining a person in customary or proper 
status or circumstances.'"3 Id. at 1211 (dictionary citation omitted). 
As the court noted in the Memorandum Decision (at 9), during the marriage the parties 
historically paid a contribution to their church of 10% of income. A regular tithing payment was 
thus one of the "necessities, comforts, or luxuries" that was customary in their married life and a 
component of their standard of living. It is appropriately considered as part of "the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient spouse" in this case. See id. at 1212. In addition, both parties 
indicated that they continued to pay tithing after separation. Given the disparity in the parties' 
3
 Because a purpose of alimony is "to approximate the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage, to the extent possible", the "needs of the recipient spouse" are not limited to %tonly basic 
needs" or the minimum necessary for subsistence, but also include "necessities, comforts, and 
luxuries" enjoyed during the marriage. See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212.. 
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income and petitioner's other established needs, if no allowance were made in the alimony 
determination, she would likely be unable to pay tithing without sacrificing other legitimate needs. 
Petitioner, on the other hand could afford to continue tithing payments without such sacrifice, and 
is able to continue such payments at the level of alimony set by the court. If the court failed to 
consider the parties' tithing payments as part of their standard of living, the alimony award would 
fail to meet the goal of "'equalizing] the parties' respective post-divorce living standards '" Id 
at 1211 (citation omitted; modification added). 
The court therefore concludes that the parties' respective church contributions were 
appropriately considered in determining alimony. 
B. RETROACTIVE ALIMONY and the AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Respondent argues that if the retroactive alimony award stands, petitioner will receive a 
windfall from which she should be required to pay her own attorney's fees. Alimony is an award 
of spousal support based on need and is not a windfall to the recipient spouse. In this case, the court 
has modified the alimony award to make it retroactive to May 2004, which appears to reduce the 
amount of retroactive alimony to be paid by petitioner. Further, the court deducted attorney's fee 
payments from petitioner's expenses in determining her needs for purposes of alimony, so there is 
no overlap of retroactive alimony and payment for attorney's fees. Respondent's objection to the 
award of attorney's fees on this basis is therefore not well taken. 
Respondent also criticizes the completeness of the Affidavit of Attorney Fees submitted by 
counsel for petitioner. While the Affidavit has not yet been filed, the court agrees that the Affidavit 
should provide sufficient detail about the actual work performed for the court to determine whether 
the fees requested were reasonable and necessary Counsel should submit an appropriate affidavit, 
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incorporating the documentation submitted at trial, so the information regarding fees is readily 
reviewable. 
C. PARENT TIME ISSUES. 
Respondent criticizes the court's ruling regarding parent time, in particular the provision for 
a gradual increase of respondent's parent time up to the level of statutory guidelines, while requiring 
that he attend counseling. The court agrees that its parent-time ruling may not be workable. The 
children are apparently not in therapy at this point, as the court believed; and other aspects of the 
parent-time provisions are perhaps too open-ended. 
The court believes its concerns, stated in the Memorandum Decision, can more realistically 
be addressed by providing for parent-time per the applicable statutory guidelines, with respondent 
required to successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally equivalent to the multi-week 
parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral. Once respondent has done this, 
parent-time should begin under the applicable statutory guidelines (probably section 30-3-37 because 
of the respondent's residence in Alaska). The court's primary concern is that respondent complete 
the course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time. If respondent comes to 
Utah to visit in the interim, he may have parent-time here without having first completed the class, 
so long as he gives reasonable notice. Such parent-time should be at a minimum equivalent to that 
provided for in U.C.A. § 30-3-35, i.e., one weekend, to begin with the weekend just after he arrives 
or the weekend on which he arrives, and at least one weeknight, unless the parties otherwise agree. 
Respondent should also be given liberal access to the children for telephone communication, at least 
three times per week at a minimum, and for email, if available.. 
The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (attn. Kathy Reimherr (cell: 556-6037)) to 
determine the nature of its parenting class, and respondent can complete that program or one in 
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Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska 
counterpart of DCFS). No later than 30 days from the date of this Memorandum Decision, 
respondent's counsel should provide petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends 
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of this 
decision, respondent should complete the class as soon as reasonably possible; if in disagreement 
they should approach the court for resolution, prepared to offer specific alternatives. As soon as 
respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate 
parenting class, visitation under the statutory guidelines can begin, including travel to Alaska. 
Before completion of the course, visitation will be limited to local visits in Utah, as explained above. 
The Advisory Guidelines contained in U.C.A. § 30-3-33 shall apply, as appropriate to the parties' 
circumstances. 
The court therefore modifies its parent-time ruling to provide for parent-time as set forth 
above. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, as follows 
1. Respondent' s Motion for Reconsideration and Objections to Proposed Findings and 
Decree is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above. 
2. The court's Memorandum Decision, dated June 2,2005, is accordingly supplemented 
and modified as set forth above. 
3. Counsel for petitioner is to make appropriate modifications to the proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and the decree that take into account the court's ruling as set forth 
herein. 
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DATED this J3m y of December, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
(...'\\5>^ 
Stephen L. Roth 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, ; 
Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 034905249 DA 
) Judge Stephen L. Roth 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L Roth of the above-
entitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, J Bruce Reading The Court, having heard argument of counsel and 
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the 
*3y 
HUE D a** i Hicr ceufu 
•Third Judicial D i s t r t ^ 
MAYl|9, 
SAI/LAK^OUIJITY 
matter under advisement, and being otherwise folly advised in the premises, hereby finds as 
foiiows 
1. JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS: As a threshold matter, the court notes that 
Petitioner has lived in Salt Lake County since January, 2003, after the separation of the parties in 
about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter of this case Further, the parties have come to disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their 
life together, perhaps most importantly over the approach to raising and disciplining their children 
While Respondent states that he does not desire a divorce, the parties had the benefit of 
counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been separated for over two (2) years and have 
established separate lives The court concludes that there are grounds for entering a decree of 
divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from 
continuing 
2. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this 
marriage, of whom four are still minors Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen 
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin 
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 The parties do not contest child custody and appear 
to be in agreement with Petitioner should have sole physical and legal custody Petitioner was the 
primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties' separation and the children continue to live 
with her at their present home in West Valley City, Utah, while Kenneth has remained in Alaska, 
2 
where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on August 20, 1980 Petitioner appears 
to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be a fit parent There is no 
indication that the children have any different custody preference The court concludes that 
Petitioner is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is not reason to disturb the parties' 
own agreement with respect to custody 
3. For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from 
almost any source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute See U C. A, Section 78-
45-7.7(1). At the time of trial Respondent was working M time for Aurora Electric in 
Anchorage as a project manager/estimator, earning a salary of $1,188 47 per week according to a 
January 28, 2005, Employer Earnings Statement showing about $61,800 00 per year Apparently 
some time in 2003, after the parties' separation, Respondent was promoted to this supervisory 
position from the journeyman electrician position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric 
He received a lower salary in the prior position, but normally and consistently worked substantial 
overtime (more than 40 hours per week) during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000 00 
(2001 W-2) to $6,000 00 (2002 W-2) more each year than he does now, because as a supervisor, 
overtime is no longer available to him Respondent testified that he took the promotion because it 
was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged him to take the new position for the 
benefit of the company While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took the 
promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of this proceeding, this was in 
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significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income For this reason, the 
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which he made up to 
$1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his 
historical overtime In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700 00 per year a 
reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and 
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position to 
accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely 
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the 
past, from scrapping or other work 
4. In addition, Respondent receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the 
State of Alaska The most recent such distribution was $919, and Respondent testified that it was 
sometimes less and sometimes more The court finds that a reasonable estimate of Respondent's 
income from state distributions is between $500 and $2,000, with the average bearing significantly 
toward the higher figure, or about $1,500 This annual payment falls within the broad scope of 
gross income under the statute, and the court concludes that the $1,500 00 figure is a reasonable 
estimate of ongoing income from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child 
support and alimony) Respondent's gross income for child support purposes is therefore 
$61,800 00 plus $1,700 00 plus $1,500, a total of $65,000 per yeai, or $5,417 00 per month 
5 Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah, working full time Her last pay stub 
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for 2004 showed her annual salary to be $21,927 00 or $1,827 00 per month Petitioner's work 
experience is relatively minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would 
function during the marriage After about a year of employment, Petitioner cared for the children 
at home during the marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not 
appear to have developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the 
opportunity or the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes 
that she is fully employed in her present position at the present rate of pay, which is her gross 
income. 
6. There is no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for 
alimony or child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted 
gross income are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating 
the share of child support attributable to each party, with Respondent to be the obligated party. 
7. Based upon the foregoing, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the 
sum of $1,374 per month commencing as of the date of trial herein 
8. Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child 
until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever 
later occurs. 
9. Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support 
from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized. 
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10. INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: The parties propose that they should each be 
allocated tax deductions for two children, but disagree on which No real basis for allocation was 
presented other than the representation that Petitioner needed at least one child deduction as 
follows. Dana and Justin to Petitioner and Kyle and Avery to Respondent. When Dana reaches 
eighteen (18), the exemptions should alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with 
Respondent having the deductions for two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which 
there are only three deductions available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second 
year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one 
deduction, when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the 
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to 
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lost if the 
exemption were not available. 
11. MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical 
insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or 
her employment If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said 
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah. 
a. Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the 
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children 
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case 
b Each parent shall pay one-half (Vi) of all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent 
children. 
c. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, 
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change 
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of 
payment 
e. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above. 
12. PERSONAL PROPERTY: The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the 
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value and division of the certain personal property acquired during the marriage This involved 
essentially a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of deposit in the amount of 
approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, tools, certain items of 
apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles a van in Petitioner's possession 
and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in Respondent's possession 
The parties agreed at the end of the trial that Petitioner receive the savings account, the certificate 
of deposit and the van and that Respondent be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm 
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items The court has no reason to believe that this 
division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is 
13 There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a 
$50,000 00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300 00 Respondent proposed that the 
policy be cashed out and the proceeds be share equally between the parties It was not clear to 
the court what Petitioner wanted in this regard It appears to the court that it would be of some 
value to the parties and in the children's interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with 
Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor children irrevocably designated as the 
beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor children Once the last child is emancipated, 
the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half QA) 
of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial The parties have the option, if they 
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both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received in payment to be 
divided equally between them 
14. Further, Respondent has a 401 (k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent 
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division. 
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and 
loan balance of the 401(k). 
15. REAL PROPERTY: There are two (2) parcels of real property at issue, the 
marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in 
a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a mortgage or other 
significant lien. The parties agree that the equity of each property should be divided between 
them, but they disagree about the value of each property Petitioner believed the Willow lot to be 
worth about $10,000.00, based on unspecified calls to real estate agents in the area. Respondent 
estimated the lot to be worth $3,000.00 to $4,000.00 and said that it had an assessment value on 
the tax notice of $4,200 00. The court believes that an estimated value of $5,000.00 is reasonable 
approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented Petitioner is to 
receive $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value. 
16. The Eagle River home was purchased about twenty (20) years ago for about 
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$50,000 00 It was appraised in early 2004 at $60,000 00 Respondent says the appraisal is 
incorrect because it indicates that the house, a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street, 
curb and gutter, which it does not have He believes it is worth $47,000 00 based on a tax 
assessment and on his estimate that it will take about $13,000 00 to connect the house to 
municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house saleable Petitioner says she 
believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that the house cannot have 
depreciated in value since it was purchased The appraisal indicates that property values in the 
area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax assessments were made. 
Respondent has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value of the lack of sewer 
hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of providing such an 
improvement Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax assessments are made in 
the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that property values have 
decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000 00 over twenty (20) years ago The 
court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the circumstances 
and finds that the house is worth $60,000 00 at the time of trial and the equity should be divided 
equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties In the 
alternative, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000 00 to Petitioner 
17. ALIMONY: "[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from 
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becoming a public charge and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to 
the extent possible " Howell v. Howell, 806 P 2d 1209 (Ut Ct App 1991), citing Fletcher v 
Fletcher, 615 P 2nd 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980) The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P 2d 
1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award [1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife, [2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself, and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support " Id. At 1075 
(edits by the court, citations omitted), U C A, Sect. 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of 
factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones factors as an essence of the inquiry) After the 
determination of the needs and resources of both parties using the Jones factors, "the court should 
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage as closely as possible " Howell, 806 P 2d at 1212 In the case of a long-term 
marriage, the alimony award "should, cto the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage '" Id, quoting Gardner v Gardner, 748 P 2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 
1988) cf Howell, 806 P 2nd at 1216 n 4 ("The alimony award, however, need not be large 
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if 
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the 
receiving spouse ") Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable principles," the court 
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"may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial." 
U C.A., Section 30-3-5(8)(c) 
18. Petitioner's income, as discussed above, is $1,827.00 per month. Accepting the 
annual deductions from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax 
($465.10), Social Security Tax ($1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300.88), State Tax $551.73), and 
health, dental and vision insurance (together $1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about 
$315.00. Her net income for alimony purposes is therefore $1,512.00. (The court is not 
considering deductions for life insurance for either party because essentially voluntary (on the part 
of Petitioner) or building cash value from this point forward (on the part of Respondent)). Child 
support payments will be approximately $1,375.00 per month. Total net income, without 
consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about $2,897.00. 
19. As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Petitioner's monthly 
expenses, as set forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four 
(4) children. Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of 
separation, so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair 
substitute or approximation. While she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower 
expenses, the court found credible her explanation that she had been keeping expenses 
deliberately low during that period because of the financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce 
and had increased her expenses to a more normal level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit 
12 
7 Those deductions are supported by detailed monthly expense reports Nevertheless, Exhibit 7 
contains more expenses that the court considers as either one-time costs or not allowable for 
purposes of alimony determination Those include attorneys fees and mediation costs related to 
the divorce in the amount of $1,331 00 They also include $1,779 00 in what appears to be a one-
time cost for the purchase of appliances ($906 10 to Maytag on January 26 and $873 05 to 
Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that amount (about ($890 00) is 
a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its contents over a the long 
term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a separate house, and ought 
to be included as an expense Because the testimony indicated that the parties historically have 
made donations to their church at about ten percent (10%) of income and continue to do so, each 
listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a 
continuing part of their previous and present standard of living and will include them as 
reasonable expenses for both parties Deducting $185 00 per month for one-time expenses, 
Petitioner's reasonable expenses are $3,306 00 per month The deficit between her income, 
including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore about $409 00 per month 
20. Respondent's income, as discussed above, is $5,417 00 per month This amounts 
to salary of $61,800 00 per year, plus $1,500 00 state payment and $1,700 00 additional 
attributed income, per the analysis set forth above Deductions, per Respondent's weekly Direct 
Deposit Earnings Statement, including Medicaid $16 94), Social Security ($72 45), Federal Tax 
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$117.85), local tax $5.40) and health insurance $10.25). The court is not considering deductions 
for 401k contributions, a medical flex plan and a 401k loan repayment The loan payment 
deduction (amounting to about $193.00 per month) is to pay off a $10,000 00 loan Respondent 
took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay attorneys fees $5,000.00, a 
down payment on a new truck ($3,000.00), and a deposit in a savings account $2,000.00). The 
court does not believe the repayment on this loan, given its timing and the use of the proceeds, 
ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions appear 
reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10.00 per week) 
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses 
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the 
Respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes. 
21. The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223.00 or about 
$966.00 per month. Including an additional $26 00 per month to account for a proportional 
amount of deductions for the imputed $1,700.00 per year (there was no evidence that the state 
payment of $1,982.00 per year was taxed), the total deductions are about $992.00 per month, 
leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefits of $4,465.00 There was no evidence of the 
effect of alimony payments on Respondent's tax liability or alimony receipt on Petitioner's, but 
the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony would substantially alter the 
conclusions reached herein. 
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22. Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the 
court does not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401k loan (about $193.00 per 
month) and life insurance (which the court estimates at $65.00 per moth based on the absence of 
any other evidence other than Respondent's claim to have $165.00 in monthly expenses for all 
insurance other than deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of 
alimony determination, as they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In 
addition, Respondent claims a total of $350.00 per month in medical and dental expenses. There 
was no evidence of a need for health care that would support expenses at that level, especially 
since he apparently has employer-provided health insurance for which amounts are deducted from 
his salary; and absent any evidence of particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court 
believes that $50.00 per month is reasonable. Respondent's reasonable expenses are therefore 
about $3,628.00. 
23. Respondent therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837.00 
per month The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for 
income and expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations, 
especially as they are meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In 
determining alimony, the court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts 
involved. 
24. Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the 
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way of resources to supplement their incomes Considering Petitioner's financial condition and 
needs and her inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with 
Respondent's ability to provide support and the significant income differential between them even 
taking into account the payment and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Respondent 
shall pay alimony to Petitioner In addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long 
term marriage in which Petitioner gave up her ability to improve her skills and earning capacity to 
care for a large family, so that should play a part in the determination of alimony amounts, as well 
See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The court believes that alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair 
and reasonable award This sum approximates the Petitioner's need, before consideration of the 
alimony tax consequences, and falls within Respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the 
court. 
25 While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children 
in the home, a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the appropriate standard 
of living is also attributable to child support payments from Respondent As children reach the 
age of eighteen (18), which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court 
believes that Petitioner's income will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses 
both because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not 
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen (18) years old and because expenses, such as 
mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduce even 
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when children do leave the home For that reason, the court concludes that it is reasonable to 
increase alimony to some extent as Petitioner's income from child support payments goes down 
and as Respondent's expenses from such payments also diminish This also contributes to the 
goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living after a long-term 
marriage Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations as children reach 
eighteen (18) on the relative disparity of income between spouses) The alimony payments due to 
Petitioner should therefore increase by $100 00 per month, beginning the first day of the month 
after which each child turns eighteen (18) On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen (18), 
Respondent's income will have increase by about $1,375 00 per month, while commensurate 
alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to $400 00 per month, leaving him with some cushion 
that takes into account the purported increased costs of living in Alaska and not reducing his 
standard of living below Petitioner's 
26. Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage Changes 
in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be 
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony should be 
paid retroactive to and including May, 2004 
27. PARENT-TIME: While it is apparent that Respondent loves his children, during 
the marriage he took a decidedly harsher approach to their discipline than did Petitioner, going to 
the extreme of punishing them by the use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more 
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regularly The court believes that this goes beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and 
it apparently played a part in the break up of the marriage The children remain somewhat 
intimidated by their father, and their distance from him, both emotional and geographical at this 
point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it would be best under the circumstances of the 
separation to contact them infrequently While his telephone contacts have recently increased, he 
has seen the children only a few times since the separation. Some or all of the children have been 
in counseling to deal in part with issues involving their father. 
28. It is in the best interest of the children to reestablish their relationship with their 
father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved allow, 
at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time Under the 
circumstances, Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally 
equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral 
Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of Alaska, such as the 
Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has done this, parent-
time should begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code The court's primary concern is that 
Respondent complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for 
parent-time If Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the 
class, and upon reasonable notice, he should be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-
35 of the Utah Code or as the parties may agree Respondent should also be given liberal 
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telephone access to the children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail 
communication if available The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-
556-6037) to determine the nature of its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that 
program or one in Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class 
approved by the Alaska counterpart to Division of Child and Family Services). No later than 
thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel 
with a description of the class he intends to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed 
class meets the requirements of the court, Respondent should complete the class as soon as 
reasonably possible. If the parties are in disagreement, they should approach the court for a 
resolution, but prepare to offer specific alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written 
verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as 
set forth above can begin, including travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory 
guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the Utah Code shall be adopted herein 
29. Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year, 
provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30) 
days in advance If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only one-
half QA) of the transportation costs for that visit. 
30. ATTORNEYS FEES: Based on the Court's assessment that Petitioner's 
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expenses are beyond her income and other resources at this point and on its conclusions that 
Respondent's resources provide him with a surplus over his expenses (as discussed in connection 
with alimony, above), the court concludes that Respondent should be responsible to pay 
Petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter. Petitioner has insufficient income 
to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up to the point where her needs 
are met, not including attorney's fees. Respondent will have a level of surplus and is more able to 
pay fees. Petitioner should provide evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees she 
claims to the Court. 
31. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired. 
From the foregoing findings of facts, the Court now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the bonds of matrimony hereto and now existing between Petitioner and 
Respondent shall be dissolved and Petitioner shall be granted decree of divorce from Respondent, 
the same to become absolute and final upon the signing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce and the filing of the same with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court. 
2. That all matters and issues including, but not limited to, child custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, division of property and debts, and attorney fees shall be ordered pursuant 
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"to* 
to the foregoing Findings of Fact 
DATED this IVday of 2006 
/ 
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/ / 
K ^ tfONORABL-£"S^E|»HENX^atH / 
1
 /THIRD DIST&CTCeB&P^DGE'' 
V "• S -* ^ . S r 
21 
IV) 
Joseph Lee Nemelka - No 6620 
Attorney at Law 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, ] 
Respondent ] 
) Case No 034905249 DA 
) Judge Stephen L Roth 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L Roth of the above-
entitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005 Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka Respondent appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, J Bruce Reading The Court, having heard argument of counsel and 
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the 
matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1 Petitioner is awarded a divorce from Respondent based on the existence of 
irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from continuing. 
2 CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this 
marriage, of whom four are still minors- Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen 
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin 
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993 Petitioner is awarded sole physical and legal custody 
of the minor children 
3 Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the sum of $1,374 per month 
commencing as of the date of trial herein 
4 Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child 
until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever 
later occurs 
5 Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support 
from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized 
6 INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner shall be awarded the minor children 
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Dana and Justin as dependants for tax exemption purposes and Respondent shall be awarded the 
minor children Kyle and Avery When Dana reaches eighteen (18), the exemptions should 
alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with Respondent having the deductions for 
two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which there are only three deductions 
available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second year, and so on When the 
deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one deduction, when there is only 
one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner In the alternative, for any tax year the party 
for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to purchase the option(s) from the other 
party for the amount the other party would lost if the exemption were not available The parties 
shall exchange tax information by March 1st of each year In any event, Respondent's ability to 
claim any minor child(ren) is conditioned upon his being current in his child support and medical 
expense obligations 
7. MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical 
insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or 
her employment If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said 
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah 
a. Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance The children's portion of the 
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid The premium expense for the children 
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case. 
b. Each parent shall pay one-half QA) of all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent 
children. 
c. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, 
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change. 
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of 
payment. 
e. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above. 
8. PERSONAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired certain 
4 
items of personal property including a savings account containing about $1,000 00, a certificate of 
deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000 00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, 
tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles* a van in 
Petitioner's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in 
Respondent's possession. Petitioner shall be awarded the savings account, the certificate of 
deposit and the van and Respondent shall be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm 
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. 
9. There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a 
$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. It is in minor children's interest to 
keep the insurance policy in place, with Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor 
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor 
children. Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive 
within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half (V2) of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time 
of trial. The parties have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, 
with the amount received in payment to be divided equally between them 
10. Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent 
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division. 
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Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and 
loan balance of the 401 (k). 
11 REAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired two (2) parcels of 
real property the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 
acre lot located in a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a 
mortgage or other significant lien. Respondent shall be awarded the Willow lot, but shall pay to 
Petitioner the sum of $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value. 
12. The Eagle River residence shall be sold and the proceeds shall be split equally 
between the parties. However, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00 
to Petitioner. 
13. ALIMONY: Petitioner is awarded the sum of $420.00 per month in alimony 
from Respondent. The alimony payment due to Petitioner shall increase by $100.00 per month, 
beginning the first day of the month after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis, 
when the last child turns eighteen (18), the alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to an 
additional $400.00 per month. 
14. Alimony shall continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes 
in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be 
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate Alimony shall also 
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be paid retroactive to and including May, 2004 Said alimony obligation shall be automatically 
withheld by the Office of Recovery Services 
15 PARENT-TIME: Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is 
functionally equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on 
court referral Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of 
Alaska, such as the Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection Once Respondent has 
done this, parent-time shall begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code Respondent must 
complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time If 
Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the class, and upon 
reasonable notice, he shall be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-35 of the Utah 
Code, or as the parties may agree Respondent shall also be given liberal telephone access to the 
children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail communication if available The 
parties shall contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-556-6037) to determine the nature of 
its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that program or one in Alaska that is roughly 
equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska counterpart to 
Division of Child and Family Services) No later than thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, 
Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends 
to take If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of the 
court, Respondent shall complete the class as soon as reasonably possible If the parties are in 
7 
disagreement, they shall approach the court for a resolution, but prepare to offer specific 
alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully 
completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as set forth above can begin, including 
travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the 
Utah Code shall be adopted herein. 
16. Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year, 
provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30) 
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only one-
half QA) of the transportation costs for that visit. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES: Respondent shall be responsible to pay Petitioner's 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter in the sum of $4,488.00. 
18. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired. 
DATED this /feSlay of /t/t^f . 2006. 
^ HONORABLE STEPHEN L. ROTH? / 
* THIRD DISTRICT COVKTf^^$y 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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The Honorable Stephen L. Roth 
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Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and McHugh. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson appeals the trial 
court's alimony award, arguing that the trial court erred when it 
ordered him to pay incremental increases in alimony to his ex-
wife, Petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson, upon the termination of 
child support. Mr. Richardson further asserts that the trial 
court erred when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, 
even though- she failed to include a request for interim alimony 
in her petition for divorce. "We review a trial court's award of 
alimony for abuse of discretion. 'We will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its 
discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts.'" 
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357,17, 80 P.3d 153 
(citation omitted) (quoting Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). We affirm. 
First, Mr. Richardson contends that the trial court erred by 
ordering that, as each of the parties' children turns eighteen 
years old and the amount of child support decreases, the amount 
of alimony Mr. Richardson pays Ms. Richardson increases. 
Specifically, Mr. Richardson argues that it was improper for the 
trial court to mandate future changes to Ms. Richardson's alimony 
award based on a speculative change in her circumstances. We 
believe, however, that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the 
considerations upon which the trial court based the increases in 
alimony. 
Under Utah law, "[t]he trial court has broad latitude" in 
determining alimony awards. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 
(Utah 1985). In making such awards, "the court shall consider 
all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its 
discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed 
at the time of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) (Supp. 
2006). Moreover, "[t]he court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 respective 
standards of living." Id. § 30-3-5 (8) (d) . As the supreme court 
stated, "the purpose of alimony . . . 'is to provide support for 
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge.1" Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075 (quoting English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). 
Based on the underlying purpose of alimony, the supreme 
court "articulated three factors that must be considered in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: '[1] the financial conditions 
and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband 
to provide support.'" Id. (quoting English, 565 P.2d at 411-12). 
After reviewing the record, we conclude that upon Mr. 
Richardson's motion to reconsider, the trial court properly 
"analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of these 
three factors." Id. 
It is clear that the trial court considered Ms. Richardson's 
financial needs as well as her ability to support herself. The 
trial court noted that 
[t]he parties were married for over twenty 
years and had six children. [Ms. Richardson] 
gave up her ability to acquire significant 
work skills and earning capacity to care for 
a large family, and continued to care for the 
remaining four minor children at the time of 
trial. She is in her forties or fifties and 
is not likely to significantly increase her 
earning capacity to a point where she can 
support herself at a standard the parties 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
This court has discussed the appropriateness of such alimony 
considerations "after a long-term marriage, where the wife 
(usually) has worked primarily in the home, has limited job 
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skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The trial court determined that Ms. Richardson's initial 
alimony award of $42 0 per month was appropriate to address her 
needs, but only because that amount was "based on [Ms. 
Richardson's] present sources of income, including about $1375 in 
child support, which will decrease incrementally as each of the 
four minor children turns eighteen." Thus, as child support 
payments decrease, so does that source of Ms. Richardson's 
income. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court order 
incrementally increasing Ms. Richardson's alimony award properly 
considered her financial needs as well as her ability to support 
herself. 
The trial court also properly considered Mr. Richardson's 
"ability . . . to provide support." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. 
The trial court determined that while Mr. Richardson pays his 
child support obligations, the parties1 respective incomes are 
equalized. However, as his child support obligations terminate 
over time, his ability to pay support to Ms. Richardson increases 
while her ability to meet her own needs decreases. Without the 
addition of incremental increases in alimony payments to Ms. 
Richardson upon termination of child support, the parties' gross 
monthly incomes would be significantly disproportionate, and she 
would not be able to enjoy the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage. 
After considering Mr. Richardson's ability to pay alimony 
once his child support obligations decrease, the trial court 
determined that upon the termination of his child support 
payments, Mr. Richardson has an increased ability to provide Ms. 
Richardson the support she needs to maintain the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage. These incremental 
increases in alimony meet the goal of "better equaliz[ing] the 
parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives" 
after their long-term marriage, Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213, and 
provide Ms. Richardson with "the [approximate] standard of living 
she enjoyed during marriage," Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 
(Utah 1985) . Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Richardson incremental 
increases in alimony as her child support payments terminate. 
Second, Mr. Richardson argues that the trial court erred 
when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, even though 
she never petitioned the court for interim alimony during the 
divorce proceedings. Utah Code section 3 0-3-3 provides that the 
trial court "may order a party to provide money, during the 
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance 
of the other party." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (Supp. 2006). 
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Section 30-3-3 further indicates that interim alimony may be 
ordered "prior to the entry of the final order or judgment [and] 
may be amended during the course of the action or in the final 
order or judgment." Id. § 30-3-3(4). This section allows a 
trial court to award interim alimony and does not specifically 
state that a party must request that the trial court order 
interim alimony prior to entry of the final order. See id. § 3 0-
3-3. 
Here, Ms. Richardson did not separately request interim 
alimony in her petition for divorce, but instead simply requested 
alimony. However, she testified at trial that she was seeking 
interim alimony. Section 30-3-5(1) gives the trial court power 
to include "equitable orders" in divorce decrees, id. § 30-3-
3(5), and the trial court has broad discretion in using this 
power. See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, 942 
(Utah 1958) (recognizing that "the trial court is vested with 
broad equitable powers in divorce matters and that its judgment 
will not be disturbed lightly, nor at all unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against [its] findings, or there has been a 
plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or inequity is 
wrought"). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly 
exercised its broad equitable powers in awarding retroactive 
alimony to Ms. Richardson. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: 
£ ^ y x£^*M^ 
.a T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
symk 
Carolyn B, McHugh, Ju 
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Kenneth Andrew Richardson, 
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ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on July 20, 2007. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
is granted as to the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district 
court's award of an additional amount for alimony as each 
child of the Petitioner and Respondent reaches majority and 
Petitioner's obligation to pay support for each child 
terminates. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
Date T 
&M7-
FOR THE COURT: 
Christine M. Durham, 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 24, 2007, a -true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail or placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand 
delivered to the parties listed below: 
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